registry / Remote code execution / @raolin2025/claude-code-node / 2.7.4

@raolin2025/claude-code-node@2.7.4

Node.js AI Code Agent CLI - Zero dependencies, pure JavaScript, security hardened, multi-channel notifications, Telegram & QQ Bot remote programming, rich media upload, multi-account management

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package contains a serious unauthenticated remote execution capability reachable from configured chat channels, warranting a warning. It has no install lifecycle execution or confirmed package-controlled credential collector.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

User runs `cc-notify` and configures a reachable chat channel.

Impact

A party able to message the configured bot can run commands as the local user and receive output.

Mechanism

Unauthenticated remote command execution via chat messages.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/channel/notify-daemon.jssrc/channel/tg-listener.js.claude-code/notify-api-key.txt~/.cc-node/cc-notify.pid~/.cc-node/cc-notify.log

Network endpoints1

api.telegram.org

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

Telegram messages are forwarded without sender authorization.
`/run` passes remote text directly to `execSync`.
The daemon returns command output through the configured chat channel.

Evidence against

No npm lifecycle hooks are declared.
Daemon startup requires explicit `cc-notify` execution.
Observed fixed network use is official Telegram/npm service integration, not a hardcoded third-party collector.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 56 file(s), 431 KB of source, external domains: api.deepseek.com, api.github.com, api.search.brave.com, api.sgroup.qq.com, api.telegram.org, bots.qq.com, registry.npmjs.org, www.googleapis.com

Source & flagged code

11 flagged

src/tools/bash.jsView file

4*/ L5: import { spawn } from 'child_process' L6: import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/tools/bash.jsView on unpkg · L4

55// 跨平台 shell 选择： L56: // - Windows: 优先用 Git Bash（如已安装），否则用 cmd.exe /c L57: // - 其他平台: 用 SHELL 环境变量或默认 /bin/bash

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/tools/bash.jsView on unpkg · L55

src/tools/npm-publish.jsView file

4* 封装了本项目 npm 发布的全部经验（见 NPM_STAGED_PUBLISH_GUIDE.md）： L5: * - 标准 `npm publish` 常因 npm CLI 强制 otplease/2FA 返回 403 L6: * - 最有效方法：bypass-2FA GAT token + 手动构造 PUT 请求 + `npm-auth-type: bearer`，无需 OTP ... L14: */ L15: import { execSync } from 'child_process' L16: import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs' ... L25: 前置条件: L26: - 项目根目录（含 package.json） L27: - ~/.npmrc 中配置了 bypass-2FA 的 _authToken（npm_... 前缀） ... L92: try { L93: const npmrc = readFileSync(join(process.env.HOME, '.npmrc'), 'utf-8') L94: const m = npmrc.match(/_authToken=([^\s]+)/)

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

src/tools/npm-publish.jsView on unpkg · L4

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/tools/npm-publish.jsView on unpkg · L4

src/channel/notify-daemon.jsView file

30import { homedir } from 'node:os' L31: import { spawn, execSync } from 'node:child_process' L32: import { createConnection } from 'node:net' L33: import crypto from 'node:crypto' ... L42: // 生成或加载 API Key L43: let apiKey = process.env.CC_NOTIFY_API_KEY || '' L44: if (!apiKey) {

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

src/channel/notify-daemon.jsView on unpkg · L30

22Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L22: */ L23: import { createServer } from 'node:http' L24: import { ... L30: import { homedir } from 'node:os' L31: import { spawn, execSync } from 'node:child_process' L32: import { createConnection } from 'node:net' ... L42: // 生成或加载 API Key L43: let apiKey = process.env.CC_NOTIFY_API_KEY || '' L44: if (!apiKey) { L45: const configDir = join(process.cwd(), '.claude-code') L46: const configPath = join(configDir, 'notify-api-key.txt') ... L76: try {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

src/channel/notify-daemon.jsView on unpkg · L22

22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> src/channel/notify-daemon.js L22: */ L23: import { createServer } from 'node:http' L24: import { ... L30: import { homedir } from 'node:os' L31: import { spawn, execSync } from 'node:child_process' L32: import { createConnection } from 'node:net' ... L42: // 生成或加载 API Key L43: let apiKey = process.env.CC_NOTIFY_API_KEY || '' L44: if (!apiKey) { L45: const configDir = join(process.cwd(), '.claude-code') L46: const configPath = join(configDir, 'notify-api-key.txt') ... L76: try {

src/security/ssrf-guard.jsView file

8*/ L9: import { lookup as dnsLookup } from 'dns' L10: import { isIP } from 'net'

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

src/security/ssrf-guard.jsView on unpkg · L8

src/security/enhanced-permission.jsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. ult.reasons.join('; ') : undefined, detail: result, } } case 'webfetch': { const url = input.url || '' if (!url) return { safe: true } const result = await checkurlsafety(url) return { safe: result.allowed, reason: result.reason, } } default: return { safe: true } } } _extractpattern(toolname, input) { switch (toolname) { case 'bash': return input.command || '' case 'read': case 'edit': case 'write': return input.file_path || '' case 'glob': case 'grep':

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

src/security/enhanced-permission.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

11 flagged · loading source

src/tools/bash.jsView file

4*/ L5: import { spawn } from 'child_process' L6: import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/tools/bash.jsView on unpkg · L4

55// 跨平台 shell 选择： L56: // - Windows: 优先用 Git Bash（如已安装），否则用 cmd.exe /c L57: // - 其他平台: 用 SHELL 环境变量或默认 /bin/bash

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/tools/bash.jsView on unpkg · L55

src/tools/npm-publish.jsView file

Findings

5 Critical5 High3 Medium6 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionsrc/channel/notify-daemon.js

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationsrc/channel/notify-daemon.js

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationsrc/tools/npm-publish.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitysrc/channel/notify-daemon.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltasrc/channel/notify-daemon.js

HighChild Processsrc/tools/bash.js

HighShellsrc/tools/bash.js

HighCloud Metadata Accesssrc/security/ssrf-guard.js

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationsrc/security/enhanced-permission.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationsrc/channel/notify-daemon.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @raolin2025/claude-code-node@2.7.4.

See all versions of @raolin2025/claude-code-node for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @raolin2025/claude-code-node@2.7.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-08-19 12:49:21.751Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code