@reason-machines/cli-darwin-arm64@0.2.410
Reason CLI native binary for darwin-arm64
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe bundled executable exports locally saved Claude Code, Codex, and Grok access tokens to Reason’s service when the worker starts. Because this transfer is enabled by default without recipient-specific affirmative consent, it is concrete credential exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The flagged runtime code lists agent directories among protected paths; this excerpt does not show a configuration write.
- The bundled executable reads locally stored provider credentials and reduces them to provider, access token, and expiry fields.
- It forwards each new token to the local-subscription endpoint when local logins are enabled; fresh configuration defaults that setting on.
- The package describes local logins as on by default and says Reason receives each login’s current access token.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
bin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView on unpkg · L60A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @reason-machines/cli-darwin-arm64@0.2.410.
See all versions of @reason-machines/cli-darwin-arm64 for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @reason-machines/cli-darwin-arm64@0.2.410. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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