@reason-machines/cli-darwin-x64@0.2.426
Reason CLI native binary for darwin-x64
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected embedded application code establishes default-on transfer of saved third-party credentials to the Reason API. That is concrete credential disclosure to a recipient separate from the credentials’ intended services, so publishing should be blocked.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The embedded application source reads existing access tokens from local provider credential stores, including files and the macOS keychain.
- The app sends discovered provider credentials through its `/local-subscription` request to the configured API origin.
- Worker startup invokes that transfer when `localLogins` is enabled, and the configuration helper defaults it to true when unset.
- The flagged sandbox runtime location contains path-filter configuration for `.claude/commands` and `.claude/agents`; it does not establish a separate attack.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
bin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView on unpkg · L60A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @reason-machines/cli-darwin-x64@0.2.426.
See all versions of @reason-machines/cli-darwin-x64 for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @reason-machines/cli-darwin-x64@0.2.426. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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