registry / @reason-machines/cli-win32-arm64 / 0.2.390
@reason-machines/cli-win32-arm64@0.2.390
⚠ Under reviewReason CLI native binary for win32-arm64
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest and inspected excerpts do not establish malicious behavior, and the credential handover appears within a local-login feature. The primary executable analysis is explicitly bounded, leaving material behavior unresolved; manual review is appropriate.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Running the bundled native CLI or its worker; complete activation could not be verified from the available analysis.
Impact
An attack impact could not be established; the incomplete primary-executable analysis prevents resolving whether additional behavior exists.
Mechanism
The analyzed code includes local coding-agent credential collection and a setting-gated handover flow, but the available excerpts do not establish the full executable call chain or recipient behavior.
AI rationale
The manifest and inspected excerpts do not establish malicious behavior, and the credential handover appears within a local-login feature. The primary executable analysis is explicitly bounded, leaving material behavior unresolved; manual review is appropriate.
Evidence
.lpm-inspection-3frWEh/0-3ea84b9d27d6.txt
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Manual Review at 80.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.
AI review observations
- The manifest identifies a Windows ARM64 native-binary package; the inspected manifest excerpt shows no JavaScript entry point.
- The bundled runtime contains code that reads credentials from local coding-agent stores and hands them to a local-login flow when enabled.
- The offline executable analysis is explicitly bounded and cannot establish loader reachability or rule out other native behavior.
- The indicated runtime location filters paths and names agent command and agent directories; that excerpt alone does not establish a configuration change.
Evidence against
- The inspected manifest excerpt contains package metadata and bundled-file declarations, with no lifecycle script shown.
- The inspected excerpts do not establish an unrelated credential recipient or a concrete attack.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
HighEntropyStringsMinified
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcebin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView file
60mux backend dial failed (${H})
L61: `)}),M.on("error",()=>O.destroy()),M.once("close",()=>O.destroy()),O.once("close",()=>M.destroy()),M.pipe(O),O.pipe(M)}let U=$6((M)=>{G.add(M),M.once("close",()=>G.delete(M)),M.on(...
L62: `).filter(Boolean);if(F===1)return[];throw Error(`ripgrep failed with exit code ${F}: ${q}`)}import{join as V0,dirname as T6}from"path";import{fileURLToPath as S6}from"url";import*...
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
bin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView on unpkg · L6055\r
L56: `)}}),J.on("request",async(Q,Y)=>{Q.on("error",(G)=>{Z(`Client request error: ${G.message}`,{level:"error"})}),Y.on("error",(G)=>{Z(`Client response error: ${G.message}`,{level:"er...
L57: `)),$.end(eq(W))}function L7($){return Buffer.from([5,$,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0])}function tq($){return new Promise((J)=>{let X=Buffer.alloc(0),Q=(W)=>{$.off("data",G),clearTimeout(Y),J(W)...
...
L60: mux backend dial failed (${H})
L61: `)}),M.on("error",()=>O.destroy()),M.once("close",()=>O.destroy()),O.once("close",()=>M.destroy()),M.pipe(O),O.pipe(M)}let U=$6((M)=>{G.add(M),M.once("close",()=>G.delete(M)),M.on(...
L62: `).filter(Boolean);if(F===1)return[];throw Error(`ripgrep failed with exit code ${F}: ${q}`)}import{join as V0,dirname as T6}from"path";import{fileURLToPath as S6}from"url";import*
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
Findings
5 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executionbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturebin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Native Binarybin/native/win32/prebuilds/win32-x64/win32-platform.node
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @reason-machines/cli-win32-arm64@0.2.390.
See all versions of @reason-machines/cli-win32-arm64 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @reason-machines/cli-win32-arm64@0.2.390 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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