@reason-machines/cli-win32-x64@0.2.388
Reason CLI native binary for win32-x64
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe worker forwards existing provider access credentials to a product service while local logins are enabled by default, creating a real credential-exposure risk. The feature is disclosed and configurable, and the inspected source does not establish misuse or a specific receiving host, so this supports a warning rather than a publish block.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Starting a Reason worker while local logins retain their default enabled setting.
Impact
Provider access credentials leave the computer and reach the configured service without an affirmative forwarding choice shown in the inspected path.
Mechanism
The worker reads local provider authentication files, extracts access credentials, and submits them to the local-subscription route through its configured API origin.
AI rationale
The worker forwards existing provider access credentials to a product service while local logins are enabled by default, creating a real credential-exposure risk. The feature is disclosed and configurable, and the inspected source does not establish misuse or a specific receiving host, so this supports a warning rather than a publish block.
Evidence
.lpm-inspection-TUONDn/0-7c6b80b44275.txt.credentials.jsonauth.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The manifest identifies a Windows x64 CLI binary package and declares no lifecycle scripts; the flagged sandbox location contains `.mcp.json` in a path-name array, not a configuration write.
- The CLI describes local provider logins as a feature and says it is enabled by default.
- The worker configuration defaults local logins to enabled.
- When the worker starts with local logins enabled, it invokes a helper that reads credentials and submits them through the local-subscription client.
- The helper reads provider authentication files; the inspected extraction code includes existing access-token fields.
- The client sends a request to its dedicated local-subscription route using the worker's configured API origin.
Evidence against
- The CLI describes the local-login feature and provides a way to disable it; the inspected code does not establish misuse of the submitted credentials.
- The sandbox-runtime scanner hit is a path-list entry and does not show an agent configuration mutation.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcess
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcebin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView file
60mux backend dial failed (${H})
L61: `)}),M.on("error",()=>O.destroy()),M.once("close",()=>O.destroy()),O.once("close",()=>M.destroy()),M.pipe(O),O.pipe(M)}let U=$6((M)=>{G.add(M),M.once("close",()=>G.delete(M)),M.on(...
L62: `).filter(Boolean);if(F===1)return[];throw Error(`ripgrep failed with exit code ${F}: ${q}`)}import{join as V0,dirname as T6}from"path";import{fileURLToPath as S6}from"url";import*...
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
bin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView on unpkg · L6055\r
L56: `)}}),J.on("request",async(Q,Y)=>{Q.on("error",(G)=>{Z(`Client request error: ${G.message}`,{level:"error"})}),Y.on("error",(G)=>{Z(`Client response error: ${G.message}`,{level:"er...
L57: `)),$.end(eq(W))}function L7($){return Buffer.from([5,$,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0])}function tq($){return new Promise((J)=>{let X=Buffer.alloc(0),Q=(W)=>{$.off("data",G),clearTimeout(Y),J(W)...
...
L60: mux backend dial failed (${H})
L61: `)}),M.on("error",()=>O.destroy()),M.once("close",()=>O.destroy()),O.once("close",()=>M.destroy()),M.pipe(O),O.pipe(M)}let U=$6((M)=>{G.add(M),M.once("close",()=>G.delete(M)),M.on(...
L62: `).filter(Boolean);if(F===1)return[];throw Error(`ripgrep failed with exit code ${F}: ${q}`)}import{join as V0,dirname as T6}from"path";import{fileURLToPath as S6}from"url";import*
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
Findings
5 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executionbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturebin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Native Binarybin/native/win32/prebuilds/win32-x64/win32-platform.node
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @reason-machines/cli-win32-x64@0.2.388.
See all versions of @reason-machines/cli-win32-x64 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @reason-machines/cli-win32-x64@0.2.388 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.