@reason-machines/cli-win32-x64@0.2.503
Reason CLI native binary for win32-x64
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected native CLI source shows a default-enabled path that collects saved provider access tokens and submits them to a configured API. Because the destination host and recipient consent are unresolved, this supports a warning for conditional credential exposure, not a confirmed block-level attack.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Starting the CLI worker with its default local-login setting.
Impact
Provider access tokens could be disclosed to the configured API recipient.
Mechanism
The worker reads local credential stores and repeatedly submits collected access tokens through the device-authenticated local-subscription request.
AI rationale
The inspected native CLI source shows a default-enabled path that collects saved provider access tokens and submits them to a configured API. Because the destination host and recipient consent are unresolved, this supports a warning for conditional credential exposure, not a confirmed block-level attack.
Evidence
.lpm-inspection-sC2XVa/0-4e311e4ed575.txt.credentials.jsonauth.json
Network endpoints1
/local-subscription
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 82.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The native CLI reads provider access credentials from local credential and agent-authentication files.
- A recurring worker passes collected access tokens to a device-authenticated local-subscription request.
- Starting the worker invokes this transfer when local logins are enabled; the configuration defaults that option to enabled.
Evidence against
- The inspected source identifies a configurable API origin and the local-subscription route, but does not establish the destination host or recipient-specific consent.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcebin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView file
60mux backend dial failed (${d})
L61: `)}),l.on("error",()=>c.destroy()),l.once("close",()=>c.destroy()),c.once("close",()=>l.destroy()),l.pipe(c),c.pipe(l)}let o=px((l)=>{a.add(l),l.once("close",()=>a.delete(l)),l.on(...
L62: `).filter(Boolean);if(y===1)return[];throw Error(`ripgrep failed with exit code ${y}: ${f}`)}import{join as dr,dirname as Vx}from"path";import{fileURLToPath as Fx}from"url";import*...
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
bin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjsView on unpkg · L6055\r
L56: `)}}),t.on("request",async(r,i)=>{r.on("error",(a)=>{C(`Client request error: ${a.message}`,{level:"error"})}),i.on("error",(a)=>{C(`Client response error: ${a.message}`,{level:"er...
L57: `)),e.end(fx(s))}function _l(e){return Buffer.from([5,e,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0])}function dx(e){return new Promise((t)=>{let n=Buffer.alloc(0),r=(s)=>{e.off("data",a),clearTimeout(i),t(s)...
...
L60: mux backend dial failed (${d})
L61: `)}),l.on("error",()=>c.destroy()),l.once("close",()=>c.destroy()),c.once("close",()=>l.destroy()),l.pipe(c),c.pipe(l)}let o=px((l)=>{a.add(l),l.once("close",()=>a.delete(l)),l.on(...
L62: `).filter(Boolean);if(y===1)return[];throw Error(`ripgrep failed with exit code ${y}: ${f}`)}import{join as dr,dirname as Vx}from"path";import{fileURLToPath as Fx}from"url";import*
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
Findings
5 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executionbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturebin/runtime/srt/sandbox-runtime.mjs
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Native Binarybin/native/win32/prebuilds/win32-x64/win32-platform.node
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @reason-machines/cli-win32-x64@0.2.503.
See all versions of @reason-machines/cli-win32-x64 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @reason-machines/cli-win32-x64@0.2.503 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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