registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @respira/wordpress-mcp-server / 8.4.1

@respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.4.1

WordPress MCP server + companion plugin giving AI native access to page builder content, not just the REST API. 242 tools, 346 with WooCommerce, 17 page builders and the Site Editor. Element-level edits, full page creation, HTML to builder conversion, sna

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected agent integrations are explicit setup operations that install Respira-owned skills or configuration, with existing skill files protected unless forced. Their ability to modify agent behavior warrants a warning under the agent capability policy, but the inspected source does not establish an active attack.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The user invokes the install-skills command or runs the setup flow with an install token.

Impact

The commands can change which package-provided skills or MCP server settings an agent loads; this review found no evidence of a hidden or unconsented write.

Mechanism

The skill command copies bundled skill files, while setup retrieves a token-bound Respira config and merges its server entry into a selected agent configuration file.

AI rationale

Evidence

~/.claude/skills~/.codex/config.toml~/.claude.json~/.antigravity/mcp.json~/.hermes/config.yaml.cursor/mcp.json

Network endpoints1

respira.press

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 85.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exposes an explicit command that copies bundled skills into the user's Claude skills directory; existing files are skipped unless forced.
The setup command fetches a token-bound Respira configuration and merges it into selected agent configuration files.
The package's own configuration code describes environment-supplied configuration as client-provided input.

Evidence against

The inspected agent configuration and skill writes are reached through explicit setup or install-skills commands, not an install lifecycle hook.
The skill installer defaults to a user skills directory, supports a caller-selected destination, and skips existing skills unless forced.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/install-skills.jsView file

Lines 19-59javascript

19import * as path from 'path';

20import * as os from 'os';

21import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';

22const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);

23const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);

24// Resolve the bundled skills directory relative to the compiled JS.

25// dist/install-skills.js -> ../skills (sibling to dist/ inside the package)

26const BUNDLED_SKILLS_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'skills');

27const c = {

28 reset: '\x1b[0m',

29 bold: '\x1b[1m',

30 dim: '\x1b[2m',

31 red: '\x1b[31m',

32 green: '\x1b[32m',

33 yellow: '\x1b[33m',

34 blue: '\x1b[34m',

35 cyan: '\x1b[36m',

36};

37function parseArgs(argv) {

38 const opts = {

39 dest: path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude', 'skills'),

40 force: false,

41 help: false,

42 };

43 for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {

44 const arg = argv[i];

45 if (arg === '--help' || arg === '-h') {

Medium

Ai Review Evidence

The package exposes an explicit command that copies bundled skills into the user's Claude skills directory; existing files are skipped unless forced.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg · L39

46 opts.help = true;

47 }

48 else if (arg === '--force' || arg === '-f') {

49 opts.force = true;

50 }

51 else if (arg === '--dest' || arg === '-d') {

52 const next = argv[i + 1];

53 if (!next || next.startsWith('-')) {

54 console.error(`${c.red}error:${c.reset} --dest requires a path argument`);

55 process.exit(2);

56 }

57 opts.dest = path.resolve(next);

58 i++;

59 }

Lines 97-137javascript

97}

98function listBundledSkills(dir) {

99 if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {

100 return [];

101 }

102 return fs

103 .readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes:

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. const bundled_skills_dir = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'skills'); const c = { reset: '\x1b[0m', bold: '\x1b[1m', dim: '\x1b[2m', red: '\x1b[31m', green: '\x1b[32m', yellow: '\x1b[33m', blue: '\x1b[34m', cyan: '\x1b[36m', }; function parseargs(argv) { const opts = { dest: path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude', 'skills'), force: false, help: false, }; for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) { const arg = argv[i]; if (arg === '--help' || arg === '-h') { opts.help = true; } else if (arg === '--force' || arg === '-f') { opts.force = true; } else if (

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg

dist/config.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/config.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/server.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.3.24 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:8.3.24 similarity = 0.875 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg

dist/setup.jsView file

Lines 684-724javascript

684 renderDoctorBox(checks);

685 console.log('');

686 }

687 // Exit code: 1 if any critical check (fail) exists

688 const hasCritical = checks.some(ch

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/install-skills.jsView file

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg

39'.claude', 'skills'), force: false, help: false, }; for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) { const arg = argv[i]; if (arg === '--help' || arg

Medium

Ai Review Evidence

The package exposes an explicit command that copies bundled skills into the user's Claude skills directory; existing files are skipped unless forced.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg · L39

Findings

3 High5 Medium4 Low

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/install-skills.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/config.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/server.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumAi Review Evidencedist/install-skills.js

MediumAi Review Evidencedist/setup.js

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.4.1.

See all versions of @respira/wordpress-mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.4.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 04:16:08.527Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code