registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @respira/wordpress-mcp-server / 8.4.18

@respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.4.18

WordPress MCP server + companion plugin giving AI native access to page builder content, not just the REST API. 248 tools, 352 with WooCommerce, 17 page builders and the Site Editor. Element-level edits, full page creation, HTML to builder conversion, sna

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The agent configuration and skill installation behavior is user-invoked and scoped to package-owned content or the named Respira server entry. Following the agent integration policy, this merits a warning for explicit agent configuration capability, but the inspected source does not support a malicious verdict.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user runs the skill installer or invokes setup with --install-config and supplies a client and install token.

Impact

These commands can add package-provided skills or alter a supported agent's MCP configuration. The inspected code does not establish unauthorized execution or control hijacking.

Mechanism

The skill command copies package-bundled skill files to the selected directory. The configuration command retrieves token-authorized Respira configuration and merges its server entry into the selected client file.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/install-skills.jsdist/setup.js

Network endpoints1

respira.press

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 83.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json exposes setup and skill installation as command entrypoints; it defines no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The skill installer defaults to the user's Claude skills directory and accepts an explicit destination; it copies bundled skill files and skips existing files unless forced.
The setup command maps client names to agent configuration paths. Its installer fetches a token-authorized configuration and merges the named Respira server entry into the chosen client's configuration.
The setup configuration installer runs only when the caller supplies the explicit --install-config command and required client and install-token arguments.

Evidence against

The inspected configuration writes are confined to explicit CLI commands and the Respira server entry; no install-time mutation or unrelated agent configuration write was identified.
The inspected sources provide no evidence of credential harvesting, stealth, or a malicious network recipient.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCrypto

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/install-skills.jsView file

Lines 19-59javascript

19import * as path from 'path';

20import * as os from 'os';

21import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';

22const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);

23const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);

24// Resolve the bundled skills directory relative to the compiled JS.

25// dist/install-skills.js -> ../skills (sibling to dist/ inside the package)

26const BUNDLED_SKILLS_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'skills');

27const c = {

28 reset: '\x1b[0m',

29 bold: '\x1b[1m',

30 dim: '\x1b[2m',

31 red: '\x1b[31m',

32 green: '\x1b[32m',

33 yellow: '\x1b[33m',

34 blue: '\x1b[34m',

35 cyan: '\x1b[36m',

36};

37function parseArgs(argv) {

38 const opts = {

39 dest: path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude', 'skills'),

40 force: false,

41 help: false,

42 };

43 for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {

44 const arg = argv[i];

45 if (arg === '--help' || arg === '-h') {

Medium

Ai Review Evidence

The skill installer defaults to the user's Claude skills directory and accepts an explicit destination; it copies bundled skill files and skips existing files unless forced.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg · L39

46 opts.help = true;

47 }

48 else if (arg === '--force' || arg === '-f') {

49 opts.force = true;

50 }

51 else if (arg === '--dest' || arg === '-d') {

52 const next = argv[i + 1];

53 if (!next || next.startsWith('-')) {

54 console.error(`${c.red}error:${c.reset} --dest requires a path argument`);

55 process.exit(2);

56 }

57 opts.dest = path.resolve(next);

58 i++;

59 }

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. const bundled_skills_dir = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'skills'); const c = { reset: '\x1b[0m', bold: '\x1b[1m', dim: '\x1b[2m', red: '\x1b[31m', green: '\x1b[32m', yellow: '\x1b[33m', blue: '\x1b[34m', cyan: '\x1b[36m', }; function parseargs(argv) { const opts = { dest: path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude', 'skills'), force: false, help: false, }; for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) { const arg = argv[i]; if (arg === '--help' || arg === '-h') { opts.help = true; } else if (arg === '--force' || arg === '-f') { opts.force = true; } else if (

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg

dist/chat-hygiene.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 4

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/chat-hygiene.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/server.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.3.24 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:8.3.24 similarity = 0.833 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg

package.jsonView file

Lines 8-48json

8 "wordpress-mcp-server": "./dist/index.js",

9 "respira-wordpress-mcp": "./dist/index.js",

10 "respira-setup": "./dist/setup.js",

11 "respira-install-skills": "./dist/install-skills.js"

12 },

dist/setup.jsView file

Lines 684-724javascript

684 renderDoctorBox(checks);

685 console.log('');

686 }

687 // Exit code: 1 if any critical check (fail) exists

688 const hasCritical = checks.some(ch

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/install-skills.jsView file

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg

39'.claude', 'skills'), force: false, help: false, }; for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) { const arg = argv[i]; if (arg === '--help' || arg

Medium

Ai Review Evidence

The skill installer defaults to the user's Claude skills directory and accepts an explicit destination; it copies bundled skill files and skips existing files unless forced.

dist/install-skills.jsView on unpkg · L39

Findings

3 High5 Medium4 Low

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/install-skills.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chat-hygiene.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/server.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

MediumAi Review Evidencedist/install-skills.js

MediumStripped Provenance Metadatadist/setup.js

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.4.18.

See all versions of @respira/wordpress-mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @respira/wordpress-mcp-server@8.4.18 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 04:18:48.233Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code