A user's WhatsApp account may follow a channel chosen by the package publisher without the user's request.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The default socket construction path schedules a WhatsApp follow to a hard-coded publisher-selected channel. This is an account action performed without the user's request, so the package is malicious.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A consumer creates the default WhatsApp socket; the follow request is scheduled for 90 seconds later.
Mechanism
The newsletter socket issues a WhatsApp FOLLOW query using the hard-coded newsletter ID 120363420757607688@newsletter.
Attack narrative
When a consumer constructs the default socket, the call chain creates the newsletter socket. That socket schedules a FOLLOW request to the publisher-selected channel 120363420757607688@newsletter after 90 seconds. This uses the consumer's WhatsApp account for an action the consumer did not request.
Avoid installing @rexzlys/wbails@1.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.