@rigxyz/cli@0.14.7
Portable, runnable agent workspaces
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic user-level agent skill setup creates a concrete lifecycle risk, so a warning is warranted. Its writes are scoped to the package-owned rig skill and include collision checks; inspected source does not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs bin/postinstall.mjs automatically after installation.
- The hook writes a package-owned rig skill under existing user-level Claude and shared agent skill directories; it can be skipped with RIG_SKIP_SKILL_INSTALL=1.
- The hook leaves an unrelated existing rig skill untouched, and the CLI also supports writing skills into a workspace’s agent skill directories.
- The package’s default workspace include list covers .claude/** but limits .agents inclusion to .agents/skills/**.
- No inspected source showed credential collection, exfiltration, remote payload execution, or broad agent configuration replacement.
Source & flagged code
13 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
src/mcp-readiness.mjsView on unpkg · L16Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rigxyz/cli@0.14.7.
See all versions of @rigxyz/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @rigxyz/cli@0.14.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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