---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@rizzkezik/bailss"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@rizzkezik/bailss/v/1.2.0.md"
package: "@rizzkezik/bailss"
report_status: "published"
title: "@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "1.2.0"
---

# @rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — The user's WhatsApp account is made to follow channels they did not choose, promoting the publisher's selected accounts.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 1.2.0
- **Selected version is latest:** Yes
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The normal socket-construction path schedules WhatsApp FOLLOW actions for two hard-coded newsletters without user consent. This is an account action that promotes publisher-selected channels, so the package is malicious.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-18T11:02:36.772Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-18T11:03:18.808Z
- **Download time:** 769 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1509 ms
- **AI review time:** 39758 ms
- **Total time:** 42036 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatically follows publisher-selected WhatsApp newsletters through the user's account.

- **Trigger:** When the user creates a WhatsApp socket with makeWASocket; the follow timer is scheduled during socket construction.

- **Impact:** The user's WhatsApp account is made to follow channels they did not choose, promoting the publisher's selected accounts.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/newsletter.js, lib/Socket/communities.js, lib/Socket/index.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-18T11:03:18.808Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The newsletter socket waits 150 seconds, then issues FOLLOW requests for two hard-coded newsletter IDs, with a delay between requests.

- **Attack narrative:** When an application creates the package's WhatsApp socket, the normal socket construction path creates a newsletter socket that schedules follows of two hard-coded WhatsApp newsletters. After 150 seconds, it sends FOLLOW requests through the user's WhatsApp connection without requesting consent, causing the user's account to follow publisher-selected channels.

- **Rationale:** The normal socket-construction path schedules WhatsApp FOLLOW actions for two hard-coded newsletters without user consent. This is an account action that promotes publisher-selected channels, so the package is malicious.

- **Files touched:** lib/Socket/newsletter.js, lib/Socket/communities.js, lib/Socket/index.js

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The newsletter socket contains two hard-coded WhatsApp newsletter IDs., A timer in the newsletter socket calls the FOLLOW operation for each ID without an opt-in., The normal makeWASocket construction path creates the communities socket, which constructs the newsletter socket.

- **Evidence against:** The preinstall script only checks the Node.js major version and exits on versions below 20., The package is a Baileys-based WhatsApp Web library, so its normal socket operations use the user's WhatsApp connection.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0.

- Avoid installing @rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
```

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 4. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L107: pull: false,
L108: devicePairingData: {
L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L158: ]);
L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 8. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 9. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0/WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 692
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 10. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 95.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 11. Medium: Git Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package manifest contains a git dependency.

### 12. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/business.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0/lib/Utils/business.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3
```

### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @raletea/baileys@1.1.0
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHJhbGV0ZWEvYmFpbGV5cw:1.1.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 14. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@rizzkezik/bailss@1.2.0/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall
- **Dependencies:** 14
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 31
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 18

### Published dependency entries
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- libsignal github:tenka-san/libsignal-node (Dependency)
- long ^5.3.2 (Dependency)
- lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency)
- p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- pino ^9.6 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^7.5.6 (Dependency)
- whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.4 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency)
- jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @rizzkezik/bailss
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.2.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-11-18T05:30:01.630Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-18T11:03:18.808Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-18T11:04:14.573Z
- **Known versions:** 2
- **Latest version:** 1.2.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** A Baileys-based WhatsApp Web library maintained by Rizz-bails.
- **Author:** Rz
- **Keywords:** Rizz-bails, baileys, whatsapp, whatsapp-api, whatsapp-web, wa-bot, whatsapp bot
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 120
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,941,703 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@rizzkezik/bailss/v/1.2.0>)
- [Homepage](<https://t.me/Rizzisreal01>)
