@roarkanalytics/sdk-mcp@3.1.0
The official MCP Server for the Roark API
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe default remote code tool copies the Roark bearer token to an unrestricted CODE_MODE_ENDPOINT_URL that is not the Roark API, which is conditional credential exposure rather than covert theft. There are no install hooks or hidden attacker endpoints, so this is a dangerous dual-use capability, not malware.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The execute code tool is on by default and uses remote Stainless sandbox execution unless the operator changes that.
- The Roark API bearer token from the environment or SDK client is copied into outbound request headers.
- Those headers are posted to CODE_MODE_ENDPOINT_URL, which has no host allowlist and defaults to the Stainless code-tool API.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall scripts.
- This is a Stainless-generated official Roark MCP server; the default receiver is api.stainless.com, not a hidden unrelated host.
- Operators can switch to local Deno execution, and docs or instructions fetches do not send the Roark token.
- Scanner malware-similarity hits match the shared Stainless MCP template, not a distinct hidden payload.
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourceSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
instructions.jsView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
instructions.jsView on unpkg · L7Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @roarkanalytics/sdk-mcp@3.1.0.
See all versions of @roarkanalytics/sdk-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @roarkanalytics/sdk-mcp@3.1.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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