@rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.570
Install Maxy — AI for Productive People
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource confirms a dangerous explicit-user-command agent configuration mutation, but no automatic lifecycle execution, payload execution chain, or exfiltration was established. Policy classifies this as warn-level capability abuse rather than malicious blocking behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/index.js explicitly installs and configures Claude Code when its bin is run.
- dist/permissions-seed.js writes Claude settings with defaultMode "bypassPermissions".
- dist/index.js installs Claude plugins at user scope and creates persistent services.
- The CLI performs privileged system/package installation and persistent deployment.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; prepublishOnly is publisher-side.
- All observed actions are reached from the explicit create-maxy-code CLI entrypoint.
- Network URLs support declared dependency/service installation; no remote payload is fetched and executed by package code.
- No credential harvesting or exfiltration path was confirmed in inspected installer sources.
Source & flagged code
19 flagged · loading sourcePackage contains a possible secret pattern.
payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView on unpkg · L349A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L142Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.570.
See all versions of @rubytech/create-maxy-code for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.570 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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