@rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.571
Install Maxy — AI for Productive People
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms a powerful, user-invoked product installer rather than the scanner's claimed install-time malware chain. Its agent permission bypass and remote bootstrap merit a warning, not a block, because setup is confined to the package-owned Maxy environment.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/index.js is the user-invoked bin and performs privileged system provisioning.
- It downloads and executes remote installers, including Ollama and uv shell scripts.
- It seeds bypassPermissions in a brand-scoped Claude settings file.
- It installs local and external Claude plugins into that brand-scoped config.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Claude operations set CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR to ~/.maxy-code/.claude, not the default ~/.claude.
- No source evidence of credential exfiltration, stealth execution, or an unconsented foreign agent-config write.
- The .br finding is a shipped compressed web asset; no loader executes it as a payload.
Source & flagged code
19 flagged · loading sourcePackage contains a possible secret pattern.
payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView on unpkg · L349A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L142Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.571.
See all versions of @rubytech/create-maxy-code for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.571 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.