registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @rubytech/create-maxy-code / 0.1.577

@rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.577

Install Maxy — AI for Productive People

AI Security Review

scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

This is an explicit-user-command AI-agent and host provisioning tool with risky permission and persistence behavior. Its lack of install hooks and absence of confirmed exfiltration make a warning more appropriate than a malicious block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Explicit user execution of the create-maxy-code bin

Impact

Installs remote dependencies, persistent services, and permissive agent settings on the host.

Mechanism

Privileged platform provisioning and AI-agent configuration mutation

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.jsdist/permissions-seed.jspayload/platform/config/brand.json~/.maxy-code/.claude/settings.json~/.config/systemd/user

Network endpoints5

ollama.ai/install.shastral.sh/uv/install.shregistry.npmjs.org/github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/github.com/ggerganov/whisper.cpp.git

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

dist/index.js is the user-invoked bin and performs a privileged full-system installer.
dist/permissions-seed.js writes Claude settings with defaultMode "bypassPermissions".
dist/index.js installs and unregisters Claude plugins, including remote marketplaces.
dist/index.js executes downloaded installer scripts from ollama.ai and astral.sh via bash.
dist/index.js creates persistent systemd/launchd services and modifies system configuration.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The behavior is reached by explicitly running create-maxy-code, not npm installation.
Claude configuration is scoped to ~/.maxy-code/.claude, not the default ~/.claude path.
No confirmed credential harvesting or covert exfiltration was found in inspected installer sources.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNativeBindings

Source & flagged code

18 flagged

payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView file

349patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 349 matchedText = local ne...:-}"

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView on unpkg · L349

dist/index.jsView file

141for (const host of ["registry.npmjs.org", "github.com"]) { L142: const dns = spawnSync("host", ["-W", "5", host], { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: "pipe", timeout: 10_000 }); L143: logFile(`DNS ${host}: ${dns.status === 0 ? "OK" : "FAIL"} — ${(dns.stdout || dns.stderr || "").trim().split("\n")[0]}`); ... L148: "--connect-timeout", "10", L149: "https://registry.npmjs.org/", L150: ], { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: "pipe", timeout: 15_000 }); ... L155: function captureNpmDebugLog() { L156: const logsDir = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", ".npm/_logs"); L157: if (!existsSync(logsDir))

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L141

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L51: } L52: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L53: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.co

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

1Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L51: } L52: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L53: const PERS

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

536// Fetch + dearmor the signing key, write to /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/. Pipe L537: // composition runs through bash -c so the curl|gpg pipeline is one L538: // privileged command rather than two separate sudo escalations.

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L536

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

1Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L51: } L52: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L53

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

284function canSudo() { L285: const result = spawnSync("sudo", ["-n", "true"], { stdio: "pipe", timeout: 5_000 }); L286: return result.status === 0; ... L288: /** True when the npm global prefix's node_modules dir is writable by the current L289: * user (nvm/Homebrew installs) — meaning `npm install -g` needs no sudo. */ L290: function npm[redacted]() {

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L284

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1

payload/platform/plugins/memory/mcp/scripts/graph/accept.shView file

20Cross-file remote execution chain: [redacted].sh spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L20: # L21: # Exit codes: L22: # 0 all PASS ... L36: if ! command -v uvx >/dev/null 2>&1; then L37: echo "FAIL: uvx not on PATH — run: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh -s -- -y" >&2 L38: exit 2 ... L64: node -e " L65: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process'); L66: const proc = spawn('node', [process.env.SHIM], { stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'inherit'] }); L67: let buf = ''; L68: proc.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => { buf += chunk.toString('utf8'); }); L69: const send = (obj) => proc.stdin.write(JSON.stringify(obj) + '\n');

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

payload/platform/plugins/memory/mcp/scripts/graph/accept.shView on unpkg · L20

payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.shView file

•path = payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 1019 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.shView on unpkg

•path = payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1019 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.shView on unpkg

payload/server/public/assets/src-BvINb2fL.js.gzView file

•path = [redacted]-BvINb2fL.js.gz kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 15903 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Ships High Entropy Blob

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

payload/server/public/assets/src-BvINb2fL.js.gzView on unpkg

•path = [redacted]-BvINb2fL.js.gz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 15903 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Compressed Blob

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

payload/server/public/assets/src-BvINb2fL.js.gzView on unpkg

payload/platform/plugins/cloudflare/mcp/dist/lib/cloudflared.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.459 matchedPath = [redacted].js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.459 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

payload/platform/plugins/cloudflare/mcp/dist/lib/cloudflared.jsView on unpkg

payload/platform/plugins/memory/mcp/dist/tools/memory-read-attachment.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.459 matchedPath = [redacted]-read-attachment.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.459 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

payload/platform/plugins/memory/mcp/dist/tools/memory-read-attachment.jsView on unpkg

dist/brew-install.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.459 matchedPath = dist/brew-install.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.459 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/brew-install.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

18 flagged · loading source

payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView file

349patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 349 matchedText = local ne...:-}"

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView on unpkg · L349

dist/index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L141

Findings

3 Critical11 High9 Medium9 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

CriticalDownload Executedist/index.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShelldist/index.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextpayload/platform/plugins/memory/mcp/scripts/graph/accept.sh

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/index.js

HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js

HighShips High Entropy Blobpayload/server/public/assets/src-BvINb2fL.js.gz

HighPayload In Excluded Dirpayload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.sh

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.577.

See all versions of @rubytech/create-maxy-code for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.577 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-08-08 10:13:55.195Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

More from @rubytech

Behavioral surface

Related packages

More from @rubytech

Source & flagged code