registry  /  @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code  /  0.1.383

@rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.383

Install SiteDesk — automated back office for independent building contractors

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM blocks this version under the AI-agent control-surface policy. User-invoked installer provisions a full SiteDesk/Claude Code environment and mutates brand-scoped Claude Code permission settings. The unresolved risk is deliberate AI agent control-surface weakening via bypassPermissions and Cloudflare autoMode allowances, but it is not install-time or covert exfiltration behavior.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs create-sitedesk-code CLI.
Impact
Unattended Claude sessions for this product may run tools and provision/persist scoped Cloudflare tokens without normal prompts.
Mechanism
Brand-scoped Claude Code permission bypass and plugin provisioning during installer run.
Policy narrative
Running the CLI installs system dependencies, Claude Code, plugins, services, and payload files, then writes brand-scoped Claude settings that set defaultMode to bypassPermissions and add autoMode allowances for scoped Cloudflare token operations. This is a powerful unattended-agent configuration change, but source inspection shows it is part of an explicit SiteDesk installer flow, not a hidden npm lifecycle payload or credential exfiltration path.
Rationale
The package is not confirmed malicious because high-risk operations are user-invoked and product-aligned, with no consumer install hook or covert exfiltration endpoint found. It should be warned due to deliberate Claude permission bypass and token-provisioning allowances that create a dangerous AI-agent capability surface.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/permissions-seed.jspayload/platform/config/brand.json
Network endpoints9
registry.npmjs.org/dl.google.com/linux/linux_signing_key.pubdl.google.com/linux/chrome/deb/deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.xgithub.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/download/github.com/ggerganov/whisper.cpp.gitollama.ai/install.shastral.sh/uv/install.shapi.cloudflare.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Suspicious at 82.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy block
  • dist/index.js CLI installs/updates Claude Code and registers Claude plugin marketplaces/plugins.
  • dist/permissions-seed.js writes CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/settings.json permissions.defaultMode=bypassPermissions.
  • dist/permissions-seed.js also seeds autoMode rules allowing scoped Cloudflare token provisioning/persistence.
  • dist/index.js runs privileged installer operations: apt/brew installs, systemd units, hostname/network config, npm/npx installs.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no consumer install/postinstall/prepare hook; only prepublishOnly is publisher-side.
  • Entrypoint behavior is activated by user running bin create-sitedesk-code, not import-time execution.
  • Writes are brand-scoped under HOME-derived sitedesk-code/.sitedesk-code paths, not global ~/.claude by default.
  • Network endpoints are installer-aligned package/vendor repos and local service probes; no hidden exfil endpoint found.
  • Secret creation is local random service credentials/passwords with log redaction paths, not harvested credential upload.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedObfuscatedTelemetryUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 656 file(s), 9.77 MB of source, external domains: 0.0.0.0, 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.joblogic.com, api.replicate.com, api.telegram.org, appcenter.intuit.com, astral.sh, brew.sh, chevrotain.io, claude.ai, deb.nodesource.com, debian.neo4j.com, dl.google.com, docs.getmaxy.com, docs.realagent.network, en.wikipedia.org, fonts.googleapis.com, fonts.gstatic.com, getmaxy.com, github.com, graph.microsoft.com, identityserver.joblogic.com, langium.org, llmstxt.org, login.microsoftonline.com, maxy.bot, maxy.setup, oauth.platform.intuit.com, ollama.ai, one.dash.cloudflare.com, platform.claude.com, player.vimeo.com, quickbooks.api.intuit.com, react.dev, registry.npmjs.org, sandbox-quickbooks.api.intuit.com, schema.org, uatapi.joblogic.com, uatidentityserver.joblogic.com, www.linkedin.com, www.w3.org, www.youtube-nocookie.com

Source & flagged code

19 flagged · loading source
payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView file
317patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 317 matchedText = local ne...:-}"
Medium
Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.shView on unpkg · L317
dist/index.jsView file
134for (const host of ["registry.npmjs.org", "github.com"]) { L135: const dns = spawnSync("host", ["-W", "5", host], { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: "pipe", timeout: 10_000 }); L136: logFile(`DNS ${host}: ${dns.status === 0 ? "OK" : "FAIL"} — ${(dns.stdout || dns.stderr || "").trim().split("\n")[0]}`); ... L141: "--connect-timeout", "10", L142: "https://registry.npmjs.org/", L143: ], { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: "pipe", timeout: 15_000 }); ... L148: function captureNpmDebugLog() { L149: const logsDir = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", ".npm/_logs"); L150: if (!existsSync(logsDir))
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L134
1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; ... L9: import { buildHeartbeatCronBlock, mergeHeartbeatBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L44: } L45: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L46: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.configDir); ... L100: ` ${BRAND.productName} Install Log — ${new Date().toISOString()}`, L101: ` Node ${process.version} | ${process.platform} ${process.arch}`, L102: "=".repeat(64),
Critical
Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1
1Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; ... L9: import { buildHeartbeatCronBlock, mergeHeartbeatBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L44: } L45: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L46: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.configDir); ... L100: ` ${BRAND.productName} Install Log — ${new Date().toISOString()}`, L101: ` Node ${process.version} | ${process.platform} ${process.arch}`, L102: "=".repeat(64),
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1
1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1
506// Fetch + dearmor the signing key, write to /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/. Pipe L507: // composition runs through bash -c so the curl|gpg pipeline is one L508: // privileged command rather than two separate sudo escalations.
High
Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L506
1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; ... L9: import { buildHeartbeatCronBlock, mergeHeartbeatBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L44: } L45: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L46: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.configDir); ... L100: ` ${BRAND.productName} Install Log — ${new Date().toISOString()}`, L101: ` Node ${process.version} | ${process.platform} ${process.arch}`, L102: "=".repeat(64),
High
Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1
1Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns payload/platform/scripts/wifi-provision-server/server.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; ... L9: import { buildHeartbeatCronBlock, mergeHeartbeatBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L44: } L45: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L46: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.configDir); ... L100: ` ${BRAND.productName} Install Log — ${new Date().toISOString()}`, L101: ` Node ${process.version} | ${process.platform} ${process.arch}`, L102: "=".repeat(64),
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1
1066console.log(" This may take 15–30 minutes on Raspberry Pi..."); L1067: console.log(" [privileged] npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@latest"); L1068: shellRetry("npm", ["install", "-g", ...NPM_NET_FLAGS, "--loglevel", "verbose", "@anthropic-ai/claude-code@latest"], { sudo: true, timeout: 2_400_000 }, // 40 min — Pi downloads can... ... L1081: logFile(`[install-permissions] action=${permissionsSeed.action} autoMode=${permissionsSeed.autoMode} path=${permissionsSeed.path}`); L1082: const marketplaceList = spawnSync("claude", ["plugin", "marketplace", "list"], { stdio: "pipe", encoding: "utf-8", env: claudePluginEnv() }); L1083: if (marketplaceList.stderr)
High
Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1066
1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; ... L9: import { buildHeartbeatCronBlock, mergeHeartbeatBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L44: } L45: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L46: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.configDir); ... L100: ` ${BRAND.productName} Install Log — ${new Date().toISOString()}`, L101: ` Node ${process.version} | ${process.platform} ${process.arch}`, L102: "=".repeat(64),
Medium
Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L1
payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.shView file
•path = payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 936 magicHex = [redacted]
High
Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.shView on unpkg
•path = payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 936 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

payload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.shView on unpkg
payload/server/public/assets/cormorant-latin-ext-500-normal-AH9qog1s.woff2View file
•path = [redacted]-latin-ext-500-normal-AH9qog1s.woff2 kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 19620 magicHex = [redacted]
High
Ships High Entropy Blob

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

payload/server/public/assets/cormorant-latin-ext-500-normal-AH9qog1s.woff2View on unpkg
payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-delete.test.jsView file
52patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 52 matchedText = credenti..." },
Medium
Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-delete.test.js

payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-delete.test.jsView on unpkg · L52
payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.jsView file
28patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 28 matchedText = password...nt",
Medium
Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js

payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.jsView on unpkg · L28
43patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 43 matchedText = password...nt",
Medium
Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js

payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.jsView on unpkg · L43
57patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 57 matchedText = password...nt",
Medium
Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js

payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.jsView on unpkg · L57
127patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 127 matchedText = email: "...0*",
Medium
Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js

payload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.jsView on unpkg · L127
payload/platform/lib/task-secrets/src/__tests__/redact-secrets.test.tsView file
73patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 73 matchedText = { passwo...' },
Medium
Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in payload/platform/lib/task-secrets/src/__tests__/redact-secrets.test.ts

payload/platform/lib/task-secrets/src/__tests__/redact-secrets.test.tsView on unpkg · L73

Findings

3 Critical7 High13 Medium8 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
CriticalDownload Executedist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShelldist/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/index.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js
HighShips High Entropy Blobpayload/server/public/assets/cormorant-latin-ext-500-normal-AH9qog1s.woff2
HighPayload In Excluded Dirpayload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.sh
MediumSecret Patternpayload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.sh
MediumDynamic Require
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencedist/index.js
MediumShips Build Helperpayload/platform/plugins/prompt-optimiser/skills/prompt-optimiser/__tests__/restatement-ladder.test.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patternpayload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-delete.test.js
MediumSecret Patternpayload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js
MediumSecret Patternpayload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js
MediumSecret Patternpayload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js
MediumSecret Patternpayload/platform/plugins/email/mcp/dist/__tests__/email-setup.test.js
MediumSecret Patternpayload/platform/lib/task-secrets/src/__tests__/redact-secrets.test.ts
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowObfuscated
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License