--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@rubytech/create-sitedesk-code/v/0.1.625" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@rubytech/create-sitedesk-code/v/0.1.625.md" package: "@rubytech/create-sitedesk-code" report_status: "under_review" title: "@rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.625 npm security report" verdict: "scan_failed" version: "0.1.625" --- # @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.625 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 42 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Scan Failed - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Under Review - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 0.1.625 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** Static Scan Results (rust-scanner) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. Static analysis completed at 0.0% confidence. No malicious behavior was detected; 42 low-signal pattern(s) were surfaced and cleared. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Scan Failed - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 0.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-19T14:18:32.280Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-19T14:18:44.492Z - **Download time:** 2039 ms - **Static scan time:** 10172 ms - **AI review time:** Not available - **Total time:** 12212 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis No additional public attack-surface or AI-review details are available. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.625. - Review the evidence and your use of @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code@0.1.625 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/scripts/smoke-boot-services.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 349 ``` ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L537: // Fetch + dearmor the signing key, write to /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/. Pipe L538: // composition runs through bash -c so the curl|gpg pipeline is one L539: // privileged command rather than two separate sudo escalations. ``` ### 6. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/ledger/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: * server: Claude Code runs `node `, and the shim runs the L9: * real entry IN ITS OWN PROCESS via dynamic import() — one node runtime, not L10: * two. Before importing, it replaces process.stderr.write with a tee so every ``` ### 8. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/admin/skills/flow-page/build.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L99: const LOG_FILE = L100: process.env.LOG_DIR && existsSync(process.env.LOG_DIR) L101: ? join(process.env.LOG_DIR, "flow-page.log") ... L178: let model; L179: try { model = JSON.parse(readFileSync(contentPath, "utf8")); } L180: catch (e) { die(`[flow-page] op=bad-content slug=${slug} file=${contentPath} error=${e.message}`); } ... L209: FONT_DISPLAY: fonts.display, L210: FONT_BODY: fonts.body, L211: ACCENT: palette.accent, ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L52: } L53: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L54: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.co ``` ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** payload/server/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5370: // app/lib/vnc.ts L5371: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from "child_process"; L5372: import { createConnection } from "net"; L5373: import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync4, rmSync as rmSync2, writeFileSync as writeFileSync3 } from "fs"; L5374: import { resolve as resolve5 } from "path"; L5375: var PLATFORM_ROOT2 = process.env.MAXY_PLATFORM_ROOT ?? resolve5(process.cwd(), ".."); L5376: var VNC_SCRIPT = resolve5(PLATFORM_ROOT2, "scripts/vnc.sh"); ``` ### 14. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** payload/server/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L358: try { L359: out.push(JSON.parse(line)); L360: } catch { ... L469: function telegramStoreRoot2(platformRoot5) { L470: const brandDir = process.env.MAXY_DIR_OVERRIDE ?? (0, node_path_1.resolve)((0, node_os_1.homedir)(), configDirName2(platformRoot5)); L471: return (0, node_path_1.join)(brandDir, "data", "telegram-messages"); ... L566: var node_path_1 = __require("path"); L567: var TELEGRAM_API2 = "https://api.telegram.org"; L568: function refusalReason(body, status) { ... L742: }); L743: process.stderr.write(`[trash:marked] accountId=${accountId} elementId=${elementId} labels=${baseLabels.join(",")} by=${by} reason=${reason ?? "null"} L744: `); ``` ### 15. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** payload/server/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L358: try { L359: out.push(JSON.parse(line)); L360: } catch { ... L469: function telegramStoreRoot2(platformRoot5) { L470: const brandDir = process.env.MAXY_DIR_OVERRIDE ?? (0, node_path_1.resolve)((0, node_os_1.homedir)(), configDirName2(platformRoot5)); L471: return (0, node_path_1.join)(brandDir, "data", "telegram-messages"); ... L566: var node_path_1 = __require("path"); L567: var TELEGRAM_API2 = "https://api.telegram.org"; L568: function refusalReason(body, status) { ... L742: }); L743: process.stderr.write(`[trash:marked] accountId=${accountId} elementId=${elementId} labels=${baseLabels.join(",")} by=${by} reason=${reason ?? "null"} L744: `); ``` ### 16. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L52: } L53: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L54: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.co ``` ### 17. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L52: } L53: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L54: const PERSIST_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.co ``` ### 18. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/admin/mcp/dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: [redacted].js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L6: import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L7: import { execFile, execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L8: import { appendFileSync, cpSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L19: import { createHash, randomInt, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; L20: import { createConnection } from "node:net"; L21: import { homedir, hostname as osHostname } from "node:os"; ... L61: }); L62: const PLATFORM_ROOT = process.env.PLATFORM_ROOT ?? resolve(import.meta.dirname, "../../../.."); L63: // Plugin-system boot tolerance — see Task 202. ... L67: const ACCOUNT_ID = process.env.ACCOUNT_ID ?? null; L ``` ### 19. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L52: } L53: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L54: const PERS ``` ### 20. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, cpSync, readFileSync, rmSync, readdirSync, appendFileSync, openSync, closeSync, chmodSync, statSync, realpathSync, accessSync, consta... ... L9: import { buildBrandCronBlock, mergeBrandCronBlock } from "./cron-registration.js"; L10: import { validateTierFlag, validateEntitlementBase64, applyTierToAccountConfig, entitlementPath } from "./tier-flag.js"; L11: import { parseOsRelease, isUbuntuLike as isUbuntuLikePure, parseAptCacheCandidate, decideAptResolution, } from "./apt-resolve.js"; ... L52: } L53: const INSTALL_DIR = resolve(process.env.HOME ?? "/root", BRAND.installDir); L54 ``` ### 21. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L285: function canSudo() { L286: const result = spawnSync("sudo", ["-n", "true"], { stdio: "pipe", timeout: 5_000 }); L287: return result.status === 0; ... L289: /** True when the npm global prefix's node_modules dir is writable by the current L290: * user (nvm/Homebrew installs) — meaning `npm install -g` needs no sudo. */ L291: function npm[redacted]() { ``` ### 22. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 23. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 24. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 25. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/memory/bin/conversation-archive-ingest.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = [redacted]-archive-ingest.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 4369 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 26. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** payload/server/public/assets/graph-labels-BTFUSc63.js.gz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = [redacted]-labels-BTFUSc63.js.gz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 9968 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 27. High: Ships High Entropy Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** payload/server/public/assets/graph-labels-BTFUSc63.js.gz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = [redacted]-labels-BTFUSc63.js.gz kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 9968 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 28. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 29. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 30. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/lib/account-enumeration/dist/index.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 43 ``` ### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = dist/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 32. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/uninstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = dist/uninstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 33. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-spawn-tee/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 34. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/admin/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-spawn-tee/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 35. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/admin/skills/\_lib/headless.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]_lib/headless.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 36. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/admin/skills/video-production/render.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-production/render.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 37. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/aeo/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-spawn-tee/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 38. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/browser/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-spawn-tee/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 39. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/cloudflare/bin/portal-index-push.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-index-push.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 40. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/connector/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-spawn-tee/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 41. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/contacts/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-spawn-tee/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 42. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** payload/platform/plugins/dispatch/lib/mcp-spawn-tee/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @rubytech/create-maxy-code@0.1.632 matchedPath = [redacted]-spawn-tee/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.632 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 2 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** @rubytech/create-sitedesk-code - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.1.625 - **License:** UNLICENSED - **Version published:** 2026-08-24T18:26:37.297Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T23:41:28.528Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-19T14:18:44.492Z - **Known versions:** 106 - **Latest version:** 0.1.636 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Install SiteDesk — automated back office for independent building contractors - **Author:** Rubytech LLC - **Maintainers:** rubytech - **Keywords:** sitedesk-code, ai, assistant, raspberry-pi, claude - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.6.0 - **Artifact files:** 4221 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 36,753,417 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()