@salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0
A Salesforce B2C Commerce CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource shows explicit, normally confirmed installation of downloaded AI-agent skills, which the supplied policy classifies as a capability warning. No evidence supports malicious intent or publication blocking.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes the b2c CLI; no npm install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency were found.
- The explicit setup skills command downloads selected skill artifacts.
- Installation targets include Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and other AI-enabled IDEs.
- The command confirms installation unless the caller supplies force.
- The installation call passes selected IDEs, global scope, update choice, and project or custom directory to the SDK.
- No covert installation, credential exfiltration, or malicious payload execution was established.
- Agent skill installation requires an explicit user command and normally asks for confirmation.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/_test/index.jsView on unpkg · L30Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0.
See all versions of @salesforce/b2c-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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