---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@salesforce/b2c-cli/v/2.3.0"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@salesforce/b2c-cli/v/2.3.0.md"
package: "@salesforce/b2c-cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "2.3.0"
---

# @salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse
- **Selected version:** 2.3.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Source shows explicit, normally confirmed installation of downloaded AI-agent skills, which the supplied policy classifies as a capability warning. No evidence supports malicious intent or publication blocking.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 93.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-30T00:40:42.488Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-30T00:41:46.947Z
- **Download time:** 1270 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1222 ms
- **AI review time:** 61965 ms
- **Total time:** 64459 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The CLI can download and install AI-agent skills through an explicit setup command. This is a guarded agent-control capability; no confirmed malicious attack was established.

- **Trigger:** The user invokes b2c setup skills and confirms installation or supplies force.

- **Impact:** Installed skills can affect subsequent agent behavior in the selected project or user scope.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/commands/setup/skills.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-30T00:41:46.947Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Selected downloaded skills are passed to the SDK installer with IDE, scope, overwrite, and directory options.

- **Rationale:** Source shows explicit, normally confirmed installation of downloaded AI-agent skills, which the supplied policy classifies as a capability warning. No evidence supports malicious intent or publication blocking.

- **Files touched:** .agents/skills

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 93.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** High

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json exposes the b2c CLI; no npm install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency were found., The explicit setup skills command downloads selected skill artifacts., Installation targets include Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and other AI-enabled IDEs., The command confirms installation unless the caller supplies force., The installation call passes selected IDEs, global scope, update choice, and project or custom directory to the SDK.

- **Evidence against:** No covert installation, credential exfiltration, or malicious payload execution was established., Agent skill installation requires an explicit user command and normally asks for confirmation.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0.

- Review the evidence and your use of @salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. Medium: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/commands/\_test/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0/dist/commands/_test/index.js>)

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 30
```

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 7. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 8. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** bin/dev.cmd
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0/bin/dev.cmd>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = bin/dev.cmd
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 193
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 9. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 10. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0/package.json>)

package.json exposes the b2c CLI; no npm install lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency were found.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
"bin": {
    "b2c": "./bin/run.js"
  },
  "bugs": "https
```

### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/commands/setup/skills.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0/dist/commands/setup/skills.js>)

The explicit setup skills command downloads selected skill artifacts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
const downloadResults = await Promise.all(skillsets.map(async (skillset) => {
            const skillsDir = await downloadSkillsArtifact(skillset, {
                version: this.flags.version,
            });
```

### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/commands/setup/skills.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@salesforce/b2c-cli@2.3.0/dist/commands/setup/skills.js>)

Installation targets include Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, and other AI-enabled IDEs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
ide: Flags.string({
            description: 'Target IDE(s): claude-code, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, opencode, agentforce-vibes, manual',
            options: ALL_IDE_TYPES,
            multiple:
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 14
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 23
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 14

### Published dependency entries
- @inquirer/prompts 8.2.0 (Dependency)
- @oclif/core 4.8.0 (Dependency)
- @oclif/plugin-autocomplete 3.2.39 (Dependency)
- @oclif/plugin-help 6.2.35 (Dependency)
- @oclif/plugin-not-found 3.2.72 (Dependency)
- @oclif/plugin-plugins 5.4.53 (Dependency)
- @oclif/plugin-version 2.2.36 (Dependency)
- @oclif/plugin-warn-if-update-available 3.1.52 (Dependency)
- @salesforce/b2c-tooling-sdk 2.3.0 (Dependency)
- cliui 9.0.1 (Dependency)
- glob 13.0.0 (Dependency)
- marked 15.0.12 (Dependency)
- marked-terminal 7.3.0 (Dependency)
- open 11.0.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @salesforce/b2c-cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.3.0
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-09-30T00:37:08.594Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T21:44:55.659Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T15:04:21.210Z
- **Known versions:** 25
- **Latest version:** 2.12.1
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** A Salesforce B2C Commerce CLI
- **Author:** Charles Lavery
- **Maintainers:** ire-npm-team-user, jimjag, salesforce-releases, jasonschroeder-sfdc, mobify, lwc-admin, salesforce-admin
- **Keywords:** salesforce, commerce-cloud, sfcc, b2c, cli, ecommerce, developer-tools, deployment, webdav, oclif
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.16.0
- **Artifact files:** 1617
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 9,569,482 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@salesforce/b2c-cli/v/2.3.0>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling>)
- [Homepage](<https://salesforcecommercecloud.github.io/b2c-developer-tooling>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling/issues>)
