--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge/v/0.1.5" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge/v/0.1.5.md" package: "@saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge" report_status: "published" title: "@saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.5 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "0.1.5" --- # @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.5 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 13 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 0.1.5 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The flagged subprocess and HTTP behavior supports the documented Xiaojiu-to-local-agent bridge, and the bot credential is sent to the Xiaojiu API. No unexpected collector or automatic credential harvesting was identified; telemetry requires an explicitly configured adapter. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 96.0% - **Started:** 2026-11-02T03:31:43.955Z - **Finished:** 2026-11-02T03:32:27.742Z - **Download time:** 510 ms - **Static scan time:** 2523 ms - **AI review time:** 40753 ms - **Total time:** 43787 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No attack identified; the reviewed subprocess and network behavior matches the package's documented bridge function. - **Trigger:** The CLI runs when a user invokes its command; bridge activity follows user configuration and incoming Xiaojiu messages. - **Impact:** Expected bridge operation uses the configured bot account and local agent; no malicious impact was identified. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-11-02T03:32:27.742Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Runs a configured local coding-agent CLI and uses the Xiaojiu API to receive and return messages. No default unrelated collector was identified. - **Rationale:** The flagged subprocess and HTTP behavior supports the documented Xiaojiu-to-local-agent bridge, and the bot credential is sent to the Xiaojiu API. No unexpected collector or automatic credential harvesting was identified; telemetry requires an explicitly configured adapter. - **Network endpoints:** https://messenger-api.4399om.com, https://im.4399om.com/open/app, https://registry.npmjs.org ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** The manifest exposes a CLI binary and a separate library entry point., The README describes routing Xiaojiu messages to local coding-agent CLIs and returning results to the same session., The CLI's default API host is the Xiaojiu messenger service., API requests use the configured base URL and send the bot token as a bearer credential., The telemetry adapter is imported only when XIAOJIU\_BRIDGE\_TELEMETRY\_MODULE is set; otherwise loading returns without enabling an adapter. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.5. - Review the evidence and your use of @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L24: import crossSpawn from "cross-spawn"; L25: import { execFile } from "child_process"; L26: function spawnProcess(command, args = [], options = {}) { ``` ### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L903: try { L904: const imported = await import(normalizeModuleSpecifier(mod)); L905: const factory = imported.default ?? imported.createAdapter; ``` ### 5. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: import { join } from "path"; L4: if (!process.env.XIAOJIU_BRIDGE_HOME && process.env.npm[redacted] === "cli") { L5: const localHome = join(process.cwd(), ".xiaojiu"); L6: if (existsSync(join(localHome, "config.json"))) { ... L17: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L18: var packageJsonPath = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "package.json"); L19: var manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf8")); L20: var packageName = manifest.name; ... L24: import crossSpawn from "cross-spawn"; L25: import { execFile } from "child_process"; L26: function spawnProcess(command, args = [], options = {}) { ... L87: let settled = false; ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: import { join } from "path"; L4: if (!process.env.XIAOJIU_BRIDGE_HOME && process.env.npm[redacted] === "cli") { L5: const localHome = join(process.cwd(), ".xiaojiu"); L6: if (existsSync(join(localHome, "config.json"))) { ... L17: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L18: var packageJsonPath = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "package.json"); L19: var manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf8")); L20: var packageName = manifest.name; ... L24: import crossSpawn from "cross-spawn"; L25: import { execFile } from "child_process"; L26: function spawnProcess(command, args = [], options = {}) { ... L87: let settled = false; ``` ### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 11. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 13. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.3 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.3 similarity = 0.500 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepare, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 5 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 31 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 5 ### Published dependency entries - @clack/prompts ^1.4.0 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - cross-spawn ^7.0.6 (Dependency) - graceful-fs ^4.2.11 (Dependency) - proper-lockfile ^4.1.2 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.1.5 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-11-02T03:28:16.791Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-09-15T13:11:03.533Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-03T12:34:54.674Z - **Known versions:** 6 - **Latest version:** 0.1.7 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Bridge Xiaojiu IM with local CLI coding agents - **Maintainers:** salt-pub - **Keywords:** xiaojiu, im, claude, claude-code, codex, cli, channel, bridge - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.12.0 - **Artifact files:** 8 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,137,074 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()