---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu/v/0.2.81.md"
package: "@saluzi/saluzi-edu"
report_status: "published"
title: "@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "0.2.81"
---

# @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. This is an automatic install-time write to user-level agent settings. The rules are restrictive and appear safety-oriented, but the write occurs without separate consent.

- **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured
- **Firewall policy:** Warn by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface
- **Selected version:** 0.2.81
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The package automatically writes to user-level agent settings during installation, which falls under the install-time agent settings control rule. The change adds restrictive safety rules and no network behavior was identified in the inspected hook, but those facts do not make the settings write user-requested.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-05T16:34:23.236Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-05T16:35:27.389Z
- **Download time:** 1771 ms
- **Static scan time:** 11992 ms
- **AI review time:** 50390 ms
- **Total time:** 64153 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The install hook changes the user's global Saluzi settings without an explicit setup command.

- **Trigger:** Package installation runs the postinstall hook.

- **Impact:** This is an automatic install-time write to user-level agent settings. The rules are restrictive and appear safety-oriented, but the write occurs without separate consent.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install-defaults.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-05T16:35:27.389Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook creates or updates settings.json under ~/.saluzi-edu, or under SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR, to append baseline command-deny rules.

- **Attack narrative:** On installation, the postinstall hook modifies the user's global Saluzi settings file to add command-deny rules. The rules reduce destructive command access, but the install-time write changes agent settings without a separate user request.

- **Rationale:** The package automatically writes to user-level agent settings during installation, which falls under the install-time agent settings control rule. The change adds restrictive safety rules and no network behavior was identified in the inspected hook, but those facts do not make the settings write user-requested.

- **Files touched:** scripts/install-defaults.mjs, ~/.saluzi-edu/settings.json (or SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR/settings.json)

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 91.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for policy risk:** The package runs scripts/install-defaults.mjs automatically through its postinstall hook., The hook creates or updates the user-level Saluzi settings file, using SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR or ~/.saluzi-edu, and writes it when settings change., The settings change adds default command-deny rules, including rules for rm -rf, dropping databases, force-pushing Git, fork bombs, and mkfs.

- **Evidence against:** The added rules restrict destructive commands rather than granting broader permissions., The inspected install hook makes no network requests and preserves existing settings while appending only missing rules.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81.

- Avoid installing @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, check your AI agents' configuration and instruction files (the files this report lists) for changes you did not make, and remove them. This finding does not by itself establish malware intent.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-defaults.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. Medium: Protestware
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 90.0%

Package source has broad protestware-like patterns that need review.

### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 9. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 10. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 11. Medium: Ships Native Binary
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node>)

Package ships native binary artifacts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node
kind = native_binary
sizeBytes = 439076
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 12. Medium: Ships Wasm Module
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/tree-sitter.wasm
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/tree-sitter.wasm>)

Package ships WebAssembly modules.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/tree-sitter.wasm
kind = wasm_module
sizeBytes = 205488
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 13. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/shiki-CMaUdEs0.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/guide/assets/shiki-CMaUdEs0.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = dist/guide/assets/shiki-CMaUdEs0.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 9555578
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 14. Medium: Oversized Cli Entrypoint
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/cli.js>)

Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = dist/cli.js
kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint
sizeBytes = 20412671
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 16. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/chunk-727SXJPM-Dk7csXo-.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/guide/assets/chunk-727SXJPM-Dk7csXo-.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 20
```

### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/diagram-OG6HWLK6-c0LfJUmp.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/guide/assets/diagram-OG6HWLK6-c0LfJUmp.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = token_shingles
matchedPackage = @p4code/cli@0.4.6
matchedPath = dist/client/assets/diagram-Q27KOJAE-Dp_H6G_V.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHA0Y29kZS9jbGk:0.4.6
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 48
summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source
```

### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/flowDiagram-I6XJVG4X-DZ7ZJ9gs.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/guide/assets/flowDiagram-I6XJVG4X-DZ7ZJ9gs.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @inkeep/open-knowledge@0.31.0
matchedPath = dist/flowDiagram-DWJPFMVM-IgVXZy1K.mjs
matchedIdentity = npm:QGlua2VlcC9vcGVuLWtub3dsZWRnZQ:0.31.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/rcs-web/assets/cytoscape.esm-D\_LviqZs.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/dist/rcs-web/assets/cytoscape.esm-D_LviqZs.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.181
matchedPath = dist/client/assets/cytoscape.esm-D3_iZ_3b.js
matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.181
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** packages/remote-control-server/web/dist/assets/cytoscape.esm-D\_LviqZs.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.81/packages/remote-control-server/web/dist/assets/cytoscape.esm-D_LviqZs.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.181
matchedPath = dist/client/assets/cytoscape.esm-D3_iZ_3b.js
matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.181
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 11
- **Optional dependencies:** 5
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 132
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 16

### Published dependency entries
- @agentclientprotocol/sdk ^0.19.0 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/acp-link ^0.1.5 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/codegraph ^0.2.4 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/sa-agent-tools ^1.0.0 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/sa-builtin-tools ^1.0.1 (Dependency)
- figlet ^1.11.0 (Dependency)
- highlight.js ^11.11.1 (Dependency)
- hono 4.12.15 (Dependency)
- tree-sitter-wasms ^0.1.0 (Dependency)
- web-tree-sitter ^0.25.3 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.20.0 (Dependency)
- @vscode/ripgrep ^1.18.0 (OptionalDependency)
- doubaoime-asr ^0.1.0 (OptionalDependency)
- libsql ^0.5.29 (OptionalDependency)
- sharp ^0.34.5 (OptionalDependency)
- undici ^7.25.0 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @saluzi/saluzi-edu
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.2.81
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-10T02:19:21.167Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-28T08:21:31.359Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-11T20:38:14.066Z
- **Known versions:** 124
- **Latest version:** 0.8.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Saluzi CLI - interactive AI coding assistant in the terminal
- **Keywords:** saluzi, cli, ai, coding-assistant, terminal, repl
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 602
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 122,609,102 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu/v/0.2.81>)
