---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu/v/0.2.85.md"
package: "@saluzi/saluzi-edu"
report_status: "published"
title: "@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "0.2.85"
---

# @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Changes the user's agent configuration and command permissions without install-time consent; the added rules are restrictive.

- **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured
- **Firewall policy:** Warn by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface
- **Selected version:** 0.2.85
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The package automatically edits global AI-agent settings during installation without consent, which meets the install-time agent-control rule. The concrete change is restrictive and the inspected hook shows no exfiltration, but those facts do not make the unrequested settings change benign under this policy.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 85.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-05T16:34:58.213Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-05T16:36:07.083Z
- **Download time:** 1024 ms
- **Static scan time:** 10926 ms
- **AI review time:** 56919 ms
- **Total time:** 68870 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The postinstall hook silently changes the user's global Saluzi agent permissions settings.

- **Trigger:** Package installation runs the postinstall hook.

- **Impact:** Changes the user's agent configuration and command permissions without install-time consent; the added rules are restrictive.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install-defaults.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-05T16:36:07.083Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook creates the settings directory if needed, merges baseline command-deny rules into permissions.deny, and writes settings.json.

- **Attack narrative:** On installation, the postinstall hook writes baseline command-deny rules into the user's global Saluzi settings file without asking. The rules block several destructive commands, but the automatic modification of agent permissions is an install-time control change.

- **Rationale:** The package automatically edits global AI-agent settings during installation without consent, which meets the install-time agent-control rule. The concrete change is restrictive and the inspected hook shows no exfiltration, but those facts do not make the unrequested settings change benign under this policy.

- **Files touched:** $SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR/settings.json, ~/.saluzi-edu/settings.json

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 85.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for policy risk:** package.json runs scripts/install-defaults.mjs automatically through its postinstall hook., The script targets settings.json under SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR, or ~/.saluzi-edu/settings.json by default., It adds Bash deny rules for commands including rm -rf, database drops, force pushes, fork bombs and mkfs., The postinstall script writes the modified settings file without an interactive consent check.

- **Evidence against:** The added rules restrict destructive commands rather than granting new permissions., The script merges the rules with existing settings and skips writing when no change is needed., The inspected install hook does not contact network endpoints or transmit credentials.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85.

- Avoid installing @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, check your AI agents' configuration and instruction files (the files this report lists) for changes you did not make, and remove them. This finding does not by itself establish malware intent.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-defaults.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. Medium: Protestware
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 90.0%

Package source has broad protestware-like patterns that need review.

### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 9. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 10. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 11. Medium: Ships Native Binary
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node>)

Package ships native binary artifacts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node
kind = native_binary
sizeBytes = 439076
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 12. Medium: Ships Wasm Module
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/tree-sitter.wasm
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/tree-sitter.wasm>)

Package ships WebAssembly modules.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/tree-sitter.wasm
kind = wasm_module
sizeBytes = 205488
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 13. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/shiki-CMaUdEs0.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/guide/assets/shiki-CMaUdEs0.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = dist/guide/assets/shiki-CMaUdEs0.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 9555578
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 14. Medium: Oversized Cli Entrypoint
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/cli.js>)

Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = dist/cli.js
kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint
sizeBytes = 20412611
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 16. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/chunk-727SXJPM-Dk7csXo-.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/guide/assets/chunk-727SXJPM-Dk7csXo-.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 20
```

### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/diagram-OG6HWLK6-c0LfJUmp.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/guide/assets/diagram-OG6HWLK6-c0LfJUmp.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = token_shingles
matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.57.0
matchedPath = vendor/codex-[redacted]-Q27KOJAE-DUGCuGd9.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.57.0
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 48
summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source
```

### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/flowDiagram-I6XJVG4X-DZ7ZJ9gs.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/guide/assets/flowDiagram-I6XJVG4X-DZ7ZJ9gs.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @inkeep/open-knowledge@0.31.0
matchedPath = dist/flowDiagram-DWJPFMVM-IgVXZy1K.mjs
matchedIdentity = npm:QGlua2VlcC9vcGVuLWtub3dsZWRnZQ:0.31.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/rcs-web/assets/cytoscape.esm-D\_LviqZs.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/dist/rcs-web/assets/cytoscape.esm-D_LviqZs.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.200
matchedPath = dist/client/assets/cytoscape.esm-D3_iZ_3b.js
matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.200
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** packages/remote-control-server/web/dist/assets/cytoscape.esm-D\_LviqZs.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.2.85/packages/remote-control-server/web/dist/assets/cytoscape.esm-D_LviqZs.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = termdock@1.4.200
matchedPath = dist/client/assets/cytoscape.esm-D3_iZ_3b.js
matchedIdentity = npm:dGVybWRvY2s:1.4.200
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 11
- **Optional dependencies:** 5
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 132
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 16

### Published dependency entries
- @agentclientprotocol/sdk ^0.19.0 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/acp-link ^0.1.5 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/codegraph ^0.2.4 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/sa-agent-tools ^1.0.0 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/sa-builtin-tools ^1.0.1 (Dependency)
- figlet ^1.11.0 (Dependency)
- highlight.js ^11.11.1 (Dependency)
- hono 4.12.15 (Dependency)
- tree-sitter-wasms ^0.1.0 (Dependency)
- web-tree-sitter ^0.25.3 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.20.0 (Dependency)
- @vscode/ripgrep ^1.18.0 (OptionalDependency)
- doubaoime-asr ^0.1.0 (OptionalDependency)
- libsql ^0.5.29 (OptionalDependency)
- sharp ^0.34.5 (OptionalDependency)
- undici ^7.25.0 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @saluzi/saluzi-edu
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.2.85
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-11T10:21:07.381Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-28T08:21:31.359Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-11T20:38:14.066Z
- **Known versions:** 124
- **Latest version:** 0.8.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Saluzi CLI - interactive AI coding assistant in the terminal
- **Keywords:** saluzi, cli, ai, coding-assistant, terminal, repl
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 602
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 122,616,149 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu/v/0.2.85>)
