---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu/v/0.5.15.md"
package: "@saluzi/saluzi-edu"
report_status: "published"
title: "@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "0.5.15"
---

# @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Installation changes agent permissions without an explicit user request, despite the rules being restrictive safety defaults.

- **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured
- **Firewall policy:** Warn by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface
- **Selected version:** 0.5.15
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The postinstall hook automatically writes to the user's global agent permission settings without an explicit request. Its stated purpose is protective and it only adds deny rules, but the install-time settings modification meets the policy's agent control hijack criterion.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-05T16:40:31.350Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-05T16:41:41.848Z
- **Download time:** 2031 ms
- **Static scan time:** 12100 ms
- **AI review time:** 56366 ms
- **Total time:** 70498 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatic install-time modification of the user's global Saluzi agent permission settings.

- **Trigger:** npm postinstall.

- **Impact:** Installation changes agent permissions without an explicit user request, despite the rules being restrictive safety defaults.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install-defaults.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-05T16:41:41.848Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook reads settings.json under ~/.saluzi-edu or SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR, merges in deny rules, and writes the file if rules are missing.

- **Attack narrative:** On installation, the postinstall hook changes the user's global Saluzi settings by adding permission-deny rules. Although the rules restrict destructive commands and preserve existing settings, this is an install-time write to agent permissions outside the package directory without user consent.

- **Rationale:** The postinstall hook automatically writes to the user's global agent permission settings without an explicit request. Its stated purpose is protective and it only adds deny rules, but the install-time settings modification meets the policy's agent control hijack criterion.

- **Files touched:** ~/.saluzi-edu/settings.json or $SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR/settings.json

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 91.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for policy risk:** The package runs scripts/install-defaults.mjs automatically from its postinstall lifecycle hook., The postinstall resolves a settings.json path under ~/.saluzi-edu or SALUZI\_CONFIG\_DIR, then reads and merges that file., The script writes the modified settings.json during installation without an explicit user command., The changes add permission-deny rules to the user's global settings, which is an automatic install-time modification of agent permissions.

- **Evidence against:** The added rules block destructive commands such as rm -rf, database drops, force pushes, and mkfs., The script preserves existing settings and only appends missing deny rules.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15.

- Avoid installing @saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, check your AI agents' configuration and instruction files (the files this report lists) for changes you did not make, and remove them. This finding does not by itself establish malware intent.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-defaults.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Low: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 45.0%

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/rcs-web/assets/motion-BILbV7YQ.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/dist/rcs-web/assets/motion-BILbV7YQ.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import{e as S,j as Ae}from"./vendor-DE_-CLIE.js";const js=S.createContext({});function Vo(t){const e=S.useRef(null);return e.current===null&&(e.current=t()),e.current}const Co=type...
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 10. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Ships Native Binary
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node>)

Package ships native binary artifacts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/vendor/audio-capture/x64-darwin/audio-capture.node
kind = native_binary
sizeBytes = 439076
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 13. Medium: Ships Wasm Module
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/tree-sitter.wasm
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/dist/tree-sitter.wasm>)

Package ships WebAssembly modules.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = dist/tree-sitter.wasm
kind = wasm_module
sizeBytes = 205488
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 14. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/rcs-web/assets/shiki-mEP5vQQu.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/dist/rcs-web/assets/shiki-mEP5vQQu.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = dist/rcs-web/assets/shiki-mEP5vQQu.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 9583817
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 15. Medium: Oversized Cli Entrypoint
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/dist/cli.js>)

Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = dist/cli.js
kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint
sizeBytes = 20494175
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/chunk-727SXJPM-B9tkz\_Zw.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/dist/guide/assets/chunk-727SXJPM-B9tkz_Zw.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 21
```

### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 95.0%
- **Path:** dist/guide/assets/diagram-OG6HWLK6-DoteZGa9.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@saluzi/saluzi-edu@0.5.15/dist/guide/assets/diagram-OG6HWLK6-DoteZGa9.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = token_shingles
matchedPackage = @p4code/cli@0.4.12
matchedPath = dist/client/assets/diagram-Q27KOJAE-Dp_H6G_V.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHA0Y29kZS9jbGk:0.4.12
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 48
summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 11
- **Optional dependencies:** 5
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 132
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 16

### Published dependency entries
- @agentclientprotocol/sdk ^0.19.0 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/acp-link ^0.1.5 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/codegraph ^0.2.4 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/sa-agent-tools ^1.0.0 (Dependency)
- @saluzi/sa-builtin-tools ^1.0.1 (Dependency)
- figlet ^1.11.0 (Dependency)
- highlight.js ^11.11.1 (Dependency)
- hono 4.12.15 (Dependency)
- tree-sitter-wasms ^0.1.0 (Dependency)
- web-tree-sitter ^0.25.3 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.20.0 (Dependency)
- @vscode/ripgrep ^1.18.0 (OptionalDependency)
- doubaoime-asr ^0.1.0 (OptionalDependency)
- libsql ^0.5.29 (OptionalDependency)
- sharp ^0.34.5 (OptionalDependency)
- undici ^7.25.0 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @saluzi/saluzi-edu
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.5.15
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-24T12:23:19.890Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-28T08:21:31.359Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-11T20:38:14.066Z
- **Known versions:** 124
- **Latest version:** 0.8.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Saluzi CLI - interactive AI coding assistant in the terminal
- **Keywords:** saluzi, cli, ai, coding-assistant, terminal, repl
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 1003
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 129,566,183 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@saluzi/saluzi-edu/v/0.5.15>)
