@sciagent/cli@1.0.54
SciAgent CLI - AI Research Assistant
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not proven intentionally malicious, but its automatic unsigned remote payload staging and runtime execution create a severe unresolved supply-chain execution path. Warn rather than block because writes are package-owned and no concrete theft, destructive action, or foreign control-surface mutation was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `scripts/postinstall.js` runs automatically via `postinstall`.
- It downloads platform binaries to `~/.sciagent/bin` from a private release server and GitHub.
- Downloaded SciAgent binaries have no checksum or signature verification.
- It downloads/extracts a CodeBuddy wheel and falls back to global `npm install -g @tencent-ai/codebuddy-code`.
- `bin/sciagent.js` later executes the staged binary with `spawn()`.
- Postinstall writes executable wrappers and changes executable permissions.
- No credential, token, shell-history, or broad home-directory harvesting was found.
- No source writes AI-agent configuration or modifies foreign agent control surfaces.
- The launcher forwards user CLI arguments to the package-owned binary path; no hidden shell command was found.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @sciagent/cli@1.0.54.
See all versions of @sciagent/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @sciagent/cli@1.0.54 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.