registry  /  @seemseam/ccb  /  8.0.7

@seemseam/ccb@8.0.7

Visible, controllable multi-agent CLI workspace for Codex, Claude, Gemini, Kimi, MiMo, Qwen, Cursor, Copilot, Crush, Kiro, Pi, Z.ai, OpenCode, Antigravity, and Droid.

AI Security Review

scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface in the inspected source. The package is a binary-wrapper CLI that downloads a versioned release artifact during postinstall and verifies a SHA256 checksum before local extraction.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
npm install or invoking ccb/ask/autonew/ctx-transfer
Impact
Installs and runs CCB CLI release binaries; no source evidence of unconsented data access or exfiltration
Mechanism
package-aligned binary download and wrapper spawn
Rationale
The install-time network and child_process behavior is real but consistent with a CLI package that installs verified platform release binaries. Source inspection found no concrete malicious behavior, credential collection, persistence, or package-unrelated network endpoint.
Evidence
package.jsonbin/ccb-npm-install.jsbin/ccb-npm-runner.jsbin/ccb.jsbin/ask.jsbin/autonew.jsbin/ctx-transfer.jsREADME.md.ccb-releaseos.tmpdir()/ccb-npm-*
Network endpoints2
github.com/SeemSeam/claude_codex_bridge/releases/download/v8.0.7github.com/SeemSeam/claude_codex_bridge

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 82.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • package.json runs postinstall: node bin/ccb-npm-install.js
  • bin/ccb-npm-install.js downloads release tarball and SHA256SUMS from GitHub at install time
  • bin/ccb-npm-install.js extracts archive into package-local .ccb-release using tar
Evidence against
  • Download host matches package repository/homepage and versioned GitHub release path
  • Archive checksum is verified before extraction in bin/ccb-npm-install.js
  • bin wrappers only call ccb-npm-runner.js to install if needed and spawn selected package CLI
  • No credential harvesting, persistence, destructive project writes, or exfiltration found in shipped JS files
  • Environment variables only skip or override release download URL by user choice
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
CopyleftLicense
scanned 6 file(s), 5.88 KB of source, external domains: github.com

Source & flagged code

2 flagged · loading source
package.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node bin/ccb-npm-install.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg
bin/ask.jsView file
3L4: require("./ccb-npm-runner").run("ask");
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/ask.jsView on unpkg · L3

Findings

1 High4 Medium5 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumDynamic Requirebin/ask.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowCopyleft License