registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.100.11

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.100.11

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 28d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The scanner’s shell and command-output indicators correspond to an explicit CLI workflow that delegates selected tasks to the Claude agent, while its output is handled locally. No install hook or concrete malicious network sink was established, so the source supports a clean verdict.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs the CLI process command and confirms or selects work.

Impact

Those actions can affect the project through the configured agent, but the inspected code does not establish covert execution or exfiltration.

Mechanism

The command syncs or pulls pending actions, then invokes Claude Code with project read, write, edit, and shell tools.

AI rationale

Evidence

.claude/skills/seoagent.claude/settings.json

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json exposes a CLI and declares the matching SEOAgent identity and version.
The flagged agent configuration path is a first-party Claude skill location; this excerpt does not show an install-time hook or a write to that configuration.
The CLI checks for existing Claude credentials and exposes setup actions through Claude Code.
The process command prompts to sync or pull actions and select work; its agent call enables project tools for processing those actions.

Evidence against

The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
The inspected command output path streams agent output to stdout; no command-output exfiltration sink was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 346 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

85- Bundle scaffolded. L86: `,"utf-8"),r.push("log.md")),{created:r,okfDir:n}}import{log as At}from"@clack/prompts";var u={info:e=>At.info(e),warn:e=>At.warn(e),error:e=>At.error(e),success:e=>At.success(e),s... L87: `))}function Yf(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${h("login")}...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L85

85Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L85: - Bundle scaffolded. L86: `,"utf-8"),r.push("log.md")),{created:r,okfDir:n}}import{log as At}from"@clack/prompts";var u={info:e=>At.info(e),warn:e=>At.warn(e),error:e=>At.error(e),success:e=>At.success(e),s... L87: `))}function Yf(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${h("login")}...

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.jsView on unpkg · L85

Findings

2 Critical4 High3 Medium3 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowAi Review Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.100.11.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.100.11 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-07 21:02:52.800Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.100.11

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.100.11

AI Security Review

scanned 28d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs the CLI process command and confirms or selects work.

Impact

Those actions can affect the project through the configured agent, but the inspected code does not establish covert execution or exfiltration.

Mechanism

The command syncs or pulls pending actions, then invokes Claude Code with project read, write, edit, and shell tools.

AI rationale

Evidence

.claude/skills/seoagent.claude/settings.json

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json exposes a CLI and declares the matching SEOAgent identity and version.
The flagged agent configuration path is a first-party Claude skill location; this excerpt does not show an install-time hook or a write to that configuration.
The CLI checks for existing Claude credentials and exposes setup actions through Claude Code.
The process command prompts to sync or pull actions and select work; its agent call enables project tools for processing those actions.

Evidence against

The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
The inspected command output path streams agent output to stdout; no command-output exfiltration sink was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 346 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L85

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.jsView on unpkg · L85

Findings

2 Critical4 High3 Medium3 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowAi Review Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.100.11.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.100.11 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-07 21:02:52.800Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.