registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.110.0

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.110.0

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 28d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source supports a warning for package-owned agent integration that configures recurring sync and inbox handling. The integration is CLI-initiated, and the inspected credential probe does not establish unrelated credential forwarding or another concrete attack.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs project setup or refresh commands that configure the agent integration.

Impact

Later agent sessions may run sync and act on inbox items, creating a guarded first-party agent integration risk.

Mechanism

The CLI writes SEOAgent sync hooks to the project's Claude settings and installs SEOAgent instructions that describe processing pending inbox actions.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js.claude/settings.json.claude/skills/seoagent

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json exposes index.js as a CLI and defines no npm lifecycle hook.
index.js targets the package's own .claude/settings.json and skill directory for agent integration.
The CLI adds SEOAgent sync hooks for Claude Code's PostToolUse and SessionStart events.
The installed agent instructions direct processing of pending inbox actions, which can lead the agent to perform project work.

Evidence against

The integration is initiated through CLI project setup or refresh, not an npm install hook.
The inspected credential check reads Claude session state to test availability; no token forwarding to an unrelated recipient was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 379 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

89L90: `))}function R(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):u[t](n)}var el=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L91: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}var Pg=1500,Tg=900*1e3,Og=2700*1e3;function Lg(e){return e?Og:Tg}function Ng(e){return`Waiting for browser confirmation\u2026 (up to ${Math.round(e/... L92: `))}function em(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${h("login")}...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L89

89Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L89: L90: `))}function R(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):u[t](n)}var el=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L91: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}var Pg=1500,Tg=900*1e3,Og=2700*1e3;function Lg(e){return e?Og:Tg}function Ng(e){return`Waiting for browser confirmation\u2026 (up to ${Math.round(e/... L92: `))}function em(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${h("login")}...

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.110.0.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.110.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-07 21:06:02.275Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.110.0

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.110.0

AI Security Review

scanned 28d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs project setup or refresh commands that configure the agent integration.

Impact

Later agent sessions may run sync and act on inbox items, creating a guarded first-party agent integration risk.

Mechanism

The CLI writes SEOAgent sync hooks to the project's Claude settings and installs SEOAgent instructions that describe processing pending inbox actions.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js.claude/settings.json.claude/skills/seoagent

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json exposes index.js as a CLI and defines no npm lifecycle hook.
index.js targets the package's own .claude/settings.json and skill directory for agent integration.
The CLI adds SEOAgent sync hooks for Claude Code's PostToolUse and SessionStart events.
The installed agent instructions direct processing of pending inbox actions, which can lead the agent to perform project work.

Evidence against

The integration is initiated through CLI project setup or refresh, not an npm install hook.
The inspected credential check reads Claude session state to test availability; no token forwarding to an unrelated recipient was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 379 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L89

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.110.0.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.110.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-07 21:06:02.275Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface