registry / Credential exfiltration / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.114.9

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.114.9

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The explicit account-status request can forward saved credentials to a configurable destination without a visible destination allowlist. This supports a warning for conditional credential exposure, but not a publish block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs the account-status command while an API base is configured.

Impact

A destination outside the intended service could receive the account tokens; the reviewed code does not show destination validation.

Mechanism

The command chooses the explicit, saved, or environment-provided API base and sends both saved tokens in the authorization header.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI accepts an environment-provided API base, allowing requests to use a configured destination.
The account-status command sends saved user and site tokens in an authorization header to the selected API base.
The manifest exposes a CLI entrypoint and declares no lifecycle hooks.

Evidence against

The credential-bearing request is made by an explicit account-status command, not by an install hook.
The default API base is the package's own service, and the inspected code does not establish a hidden default recipient.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 398 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

90L91: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var Yl=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L92: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as Mm}from"child_process";var Um=2048,Fm=200,Bm=10,Hm=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,Gm=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L93: `))}function $h(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${m("login")}...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L90

90Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L90: L91: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var Yl=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L92: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as Mm}from"child_process";var Um=2048,Fm=200,Bm=10,Hm=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,Gm=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L93: `))}function $h(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${m("login")}...

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.114.9.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.114.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 08:42:49.047Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / Credential exfiltration / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.114.9

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.114.9

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs the account-status command while an API base is configured.

Impact

A destination outside the intended service could receive the account tokens; the reviewed code does not show destination validation.

Mechanism

The command chooses the explicit, saved, or environment-provided API base and sends both saved tokens in the authorization header.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI accepts an environment-provided API base, allowing requests to use a configured destination.
The account-status command sends saved user and site tokens in an authorization header to the selected API base.
The manifest exposes a CLI entrypoint and declares no lifecycle hooks.

Evidence against

The credential-bearing request is made by an explicit account-status command, not by an install hook.
The default API base is the package's own service, and the inspected code does not establish a hidden default recipient.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 398 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L90

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.114.9.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.114.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-11 08:42:49.047Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface