registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.117.1

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.1

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The manifest has no install lifecycle script, and the flagged process use resolves to local availability and Git metadata checks. The Claude hook is project-local setup through an explicit CLI command, while inspected telemetry contains no credentials or command output.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The Claude settings hook is installed through the explicit init command; no package install hook is declared.

Impact

No malicious impact was established from the inspected source.

Mechanism

The project-local hook invokes SEOAgent's own sync command, and telemetry carries limited installation metadata.

AI rationale

Evidence

.claude/settings.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 96.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest exposes index.js as the CLI entrypoint and declares no install lifecycle script.
The project-local Claude settings hook is installed through the explicit init command.
The hook runs SEOAgent's own sync command on Claude session and tool events, and the hook writer updates project settings.
Later sync refreshes update the hook only when the project skill is refreshed.
Telemetry sends an install identifier, event, CLI version, platform, and optional metadata; no credential fields appear in that payload.
The inspected process calls check for Claude availability or read the Git origin URL with a timeout.

Evidence against

The scanner's combined execution, environment, and network labels did not establish a path that sends command output or credentials to a remote recipient.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

90L91: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var tc=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L92: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as eh}from"child_process";var th=2048,nh=200,rh=10,oh=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,ih=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L93: `))}function Uh(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${m("login")}...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L90

90Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L90: L91: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var tc=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L92: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as eh}from"child_process";var th=2048,nh=200,rh=10,oh=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,ih=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L93: `))}function Uh(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${m("login")}...

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical4 High3 Medium3 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.1.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 23:30:00.768Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.117.1

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.1

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The Claude settings hook is installed through the explicit init command; no package install hook is declared.

Impact

No malicious impact was established from the inspected source.

Mechanism

The project-local hook invokes SEOAgent's own sync command, and telemetry carries limited installation metadata.

AI rationale

Evidence

.claude/settings.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 96.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest exposes index.js as the CLI entrypoint and declares no install lifecycle script.
The project-local Claude settings hook is installed through the explicit init command.
The hook runs SEOAgent's own sync command on Claude session and tool events, and the hook writer updates project settings.
Later sync refreshes update the hook only when the project skill is refreshed.
Telemetry sends an install identifier, event, CLI version, platform, and optional metadata; no credential fields appear in that payload.
The inspected process calls check for Claude availability or read the Git origin URL with a timeout.

Evidence against

The scanner's combined execution, environment, and network labels did not establish a path that sends command output or credentials to a remote recipient.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L90

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical4 High3 Medium3 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.1.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 23:30:00.768Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.