registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.117.4

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.4

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The manifest has no install-time hook, and the Claude configuration change is made through the explicit project setup command. The persistent first-party agent hooks fit the warning category for agent extension setup, while the inspected source did not establish a malicious attack chain.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A project owner invokes seoagent init; installed hooks then run on the configured Claude events.

Impact

Project agent configuration causes automatic sync calls during Claude sessions. This is a guarded, package-aligned capability; no separate malicious action was confirmed.

Mechanism

Setup writes hooks to .claude/settings.json for SessionStart and PostToolUse write/edit events. Each hook invokes SEOAgent sync.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js.claude/settings.json

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json exposes index.js as the CLI entrypoint; inspection found no npm lifecycle scripts.
index.js names project-local SEOAgent skill and Claude settings paths.
The explicit init command dispatches project setup.
Setup writes Claude hooks for SessionStart and PostToolUse write/edit events.
Those hooks run SEOAgent sync; the configured service defaults to https://seoagent.com.

Evidence against

The hook setup requires a CLI command, and the sync destination is package-aligned; inspection found no unrelated credential transfer or confirmed command-output exfiltration.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 417 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

90L91: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var fc=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L92: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as gh}from"child_process";var mh=2048,hh=200,yh=10,wh=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,bh=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L93: `))}function Zh(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${m("login")}...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L90

90Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L90: L91: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var fc=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L92: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as gh}from"child_process";var mh=2048,hh=200,yh=10,wh=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,bh=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L93: `))}function Zh(){return`The setup code did not bind this project. Do not continue without a successful login \u2014 get a fresh code at seoagent.com/grok, then run \`${m("login")}...

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.4.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 23:31:43.208Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.117.4

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.4

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A project owner invokes seoagent init; installed hooks then run on the configured Claude events.

Impact

Project agent configuration causes automatic sync calls during Claude sessions. This is a guarded, package-aligned capability; no separate malicious action was confirmed.

Mechanism

Setup writes hooks to .claude/settings.json for SessionStart and PostToolUse write/edit events. Each hook invokes SEOAgent sync.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js.claude/settings.json

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json exposes index.js as the CLI entrypoint; inspection found no npm lifecycle scripts.
index.js names project-local SEOAgent skill and Claude settings paths.
The explicit init command dispatches project setup.
Setup writes Claude hooks for SessionStart and PostToolUse write/edit events.
Those hooks run SEOAgent sync; the configured service defaults to https://seoagent.com.

Evidence against

The hook setup requires a CLI command, and the sync destination is package-aligned; inspection found no unrelated credential transfer or confirmed command-output exfiltration.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 417 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L90

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

index.js

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.4.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.117.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-13 23:31:43.208Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface