registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.128.1

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.1

⚠ Under review

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected caller gates noninteractive processing behind --yes, and the permission bypass applies only to unattended runs. The declared Claude Agent SDK source was unresolved, so its behavior could not be verified; review remains necessary before a clean verdict.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user invokes noninteractive processing with --yes.

Impact

The agent can execute commands while processing actions; the unavailable SDK source leaves its behavior unverified.

Mechanism

The CLI passes unattended actions to the Claude Agent SDK with Bash enabled and permission checks bypassed.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 78.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.

AI review observations

package.json declares index.js as the CLI entrypoint and lists the Claude Agent SDK as a dependency.
index.js requires --yes to process actions noninteractively.
index.js gives unattended agent runs Bash access and enables permission bypass; the declared SDK source could not be reviewed.

Evidence against

The permission bypass is limited to unattended processing; ordinary agent runs use acceptEdits.
The inspected caller exposes unattended processing as an explicit CLI operation.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 454 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

9.sync-cursor L10: `,kg=process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME&&process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME.trim().length>0?process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME:Ft(bg(),".config"),Z=Ft(kg,"seoagent"),nt=Ft(Z,"auth.json"),ui=Ft(Z,"state... L11: `),i=Tg(r),s=i.length>0?i[0].indent:0,[a]=Qa(i,0,s);return{data:a,body:o}}function rt(e){if(!Eg(e))return null;try{return ee(Cg(e,"utf-8"))}catch{return null}}function Pg(e){if(e==... ... L15: `)?"":` L16: `)}import{existsSync as Rr,readdirSync as Ig,statSync as Og}from"fs";import{join as ot}from"path";var gi=["svelte.config.js","svelte.config.ts","svelte.config.mjs","svelte.config.c... L17: `).map(t=>t.trim()).filter(Boolean):[]}function Ir(e,t,n={}){let r=n.execGit??Hg,o=n.sourceExists??((y,w)=>Ug(Mg(y,w))),i=n.checkedCommit&&Pr.test(n.checkedCommit)?n.checkedCommit:...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L9

96Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L96: L97: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var Uc=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L98: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as Cy}from"child_process";var Ay=2048,Ty=200,Py=10,Iy=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,Oy=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L99: `).replace(/\n+$/,`

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.1.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-24 23:17:08.708Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.128.1

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.1

⚠ Under review

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user invokes noninteractive processing with --yes.

Impact

The agent can execute commands while processing actions; the unavailable SDK source leaves its behavior unverified.

Mechanism

The CLI passes unattended actions to the Claude Agent SDK with Bash enabled and permission checks bypassed.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 78.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.

AI review observations

package.json declares index.js as the CLI entrypoint and lists the Claude Agent SDK as a dependency.
index.js requires --yes to process actions noninteractively.
index.js gives unattended agent runs Bash access and enables permission bypass; the declared SDK source could not be reviewed.

Evidence against

The permission bypass is limited to unattended processing; ordinary agent runs use acceptEdits.
The inspected caller exposes unattended processing as an explicit CLI operation.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 454 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L9

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.1.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-24 23:17:08.708Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface