registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.128.2

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.2

⚠ Under review

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected CLI source shows an explicit agent-processing feature with guarded unattended mode, but its required SDK dependency source is unresolved. That prevents a clean verdict; the inspected evidence does not establish malicious behavior.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user invokes the CLI's `process` command; unattended mode requires additional flags.

Impact

The unresolved SDK behavior prevents confirming the scope and effects of agent-run commands.

Mechanism

The CLI passes a task to the Claude Agent SDK with read, write, edit, and shell tools enabled. The SDK implementation could not be inspected in the supplied dependency snapshot.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 82.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.

AI review observations

The manifest declares the Claude Agent SDK, which the CLI uses for its `process` command.
The SDK is configured with file and shell tools; unattended mode enables permission bypass.
The source uses `seoagent.com` as its default API base and permits an environment override.
The SDK dependency source was unresolved in the supplied dependency review, so its behavior could not be verified.

Evidence against

The manifest has no install lifecycle hook; `process` is an explicit CLI command.
The CLI defaults to edit permissions, and unattended permission bypass is a separate mode.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 455 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

9.sync-cursor L10: `,kg=process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME&&process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME.trim().length>0?process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME:Ft(bg(),".config"),Z=Ft(kg,"seoagent"),nt=Ft(Z,"auth.json"),ui=Ft(Z,"state... L11: `),i=Tg(r),s=i.length>0?i[0].indent:0,[a]=Qa(i,0,s);return{data:a,body:o}}function rt(e){if(!Eg(e))return null;try{return ee(Cg(e,"utf-8"))}catch{return null}}function Pg(e){if(e==... ... L15: `)?"":` L16: `)}import{existsSync as Rr,readdirSync as Ig,statSync as Og}from"fs";import{join as ot}from"path";var gi=["svelte.config.js","svelte.config.ts","svelte.config.mjs","svelte.config.c... L17: `).map(t=>t.trim()).filter(Boolean):[]}function Ir(e,t,n={}){let r=n.execGit??Hg,o=n.sourceExists??((y,w)=>Ug(Mg(y,w))),i=n.checkedCommit&&Pr.test(n.checkedCommit)?n.checkedCommit:...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L9

96Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L96: L97: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var Uc=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L98: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as Cy}from"child_process";var Ay=2048,Ty=200,Py=10,Iy=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,Oy=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L99: `).replace(/\n+$/,`

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.2.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-26 00:05:30.086Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.128.2

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.2

⚠ Under review

AI Security Review

scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user invokes the CLI's `process` command; unattended mode requires additional flags.

Impact

The unresolved SDK behavior prevents confirming the scope and effects of agent-run commands.

Mechanism

The CLI passes a task to the Claude Agent SDK with read, write, edit, and shell tools enabled. The SDK implementation could not be inspected in the supplied dependency snapshot.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 82.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.

AI review observations

The manifest declares the Claude Agent SDK, which the CLI uses for its `process` command.
The SDK is configured with file and shell tools; unattended mode enables permission bypass.
The source uses `seoagent.com` as its default API base and permits an environment override.
The SDK dependency source was unresolved in the supplied dependency review, so its behavior could not be verified.

Evidence against

The manifest has no install lifecycle hook; `process` is an explicit CLI command.
The CLI defaults to edit permissions, and unattended permission bypass is a separate mode.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 455 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L9

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Findings

2 Critical5 High3 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.2.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.128.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-26 00:05:30.086Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface