registry / Telemetry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.131.0

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.131.0

The persistent AI SEO agent for Claude Code. Audits, keyword strategy, briefs, articles, real product screenshots from your repo, and the autopilot loop (cloud detects → CLI executes → ack closes) — other SEO tools write the prompt, SEOAgent runs it.

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The `init` command sends the project domain to the vendor's telemetry endpoint by default, although the source discloses this and provides an opt-out. No unrelated credential exfiltration or other malicious behavior was identified.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

User runs the CLI's `init` command.

Impact

The vendor receives a domain that identifies the user's project. No credentials or file contents were seen in this telemetry flow.

Mechanism

The init flow posts an event, install ID, CLI version and project metadata including the domain to seoagent.com; telemetry can be disabled with SEOAGENT_TELEMETRY=0.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com/api/cli/telemetry

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 85.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI documents a runtime ping that includes the project domain, install ID, event and CLI version, with an opt-out.
The `init` path sends that telemetry event to the package's own `/api/cli/telemetry` endpoint by default.
The manifest identifies the package as an AI SEO agent for Claude Code, and its agent runner uses the Claude Agent SDK for project tasks.

Evidence against

The manifest has no install lifecycle scripts; the package is exposed as a CLI.
The inspected Claude credential checks support Claude Code authentication, consistent with the stated agent purpose; no unrelated credential transfer was identified.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 459 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

9.sync-cursor L10: `,Eg=process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME&&process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME.trim().length>0?process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME:Bt(Rg(),".config"),ne=Bt(Eg,"seoagent"),nt=Bt(ne,"auth.json"),pi=Bt(ne,"st... L11: `),i=jg(r),s=i.length>0?i[0].indent:0,[a]=el(i,0,s);return{data:a,body:o}}function rt(e){if(!Lg(e))return null;try{return re(Ng(e,"utf-8"))}catch{return null}}function Fg(e){if(e==... ... L15: `)?"":` L16: `)}import{existsSync as Rr,readdirSync as Ug,statSync as Mg}from"fs";import{join as ot}from"path";var mi=["svelte.config.js","svelte.config.ts","svelte.config.mjs","svelte.config.c... L17: `).map(t=>t.trim()).filter(Boolean):[]}function Ir(e,t,n={}){let r=n.execGit??zg,o=n.sourceExists??((h,w)=>qg(Vg(h,w))),i=n.checkedCommit&&Pr.test(n.checkedCommit)?n.checkedCommit:...

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L9

96Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js L96: L97: `))}function P(e,t,n,r=n){e?e.stop(r):d[t](n)}var Bc=[{suffixes:[".wordpress.com"],platform:{id:"wordpress.com",label:"WordPress.com",api:"wordpress",enableHint:"an application pas... L98: `,"utf-8"),n}catch{return null}}import{execFileSync as Ny}from"child_process";var Dy=2048,jy=200,Fy=10,Uy=/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/,My=/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-... L99: `).replace(/\n+$/,`

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Findings

2 Critical4 High4 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumAi Review Evidenceindex.js

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.131.0.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.131.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-11-03 01:14:22.067Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / Telemetry / @seoagent-official/seoagent / 1.131.0

@seoagent-official/seoagent@1.131.0

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

User runs the CLI's `init` command.

Impact

The vendor receives a domain that identifies the user's project. No credentials or file contents were seen in this telemetry flow.

Mechanism

The init flow posts an event, install ID, CLI version and project metadata including the domain to seoagent.com; telemetry can be disabled with SEOAGENT_TELEMETRY=0.

AI rationale

Evidence

index.js

Network endpoints1

seoagent.com/api/cli/telemetry

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 85.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI documents a runtime ping that includes the project domain, install ID, event and CLI version, with an opt-out.
The `init` path sends that telemetry event to the package's own `/api/cli/telemetry` endpoint by default.
The manifest identifies the package as an AI SEO agent for Claude Code, and its agent runner uses the Claude Agent SDK for project tasks.

Evidence against

The manifest has no install lifecycle scripts; the package is exposed as a CLI.
The inspected Claude credential checks support Claude Code authentication, consistent with the stated agent purpose; no unrelated credential transfer was identified.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 459 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.openai.com, api.replicate.com, console.anthropic.com, example.com, fal.run, registry.npmjs.org, seoagent.com, www.google.com

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

index.jsView file

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

index.jsView on unpkg · L9

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Findings

2 Critical4 High4 Medium2 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js

HighChild Processindex.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumAi Review Evidenceindex.js

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.131.0.

See all versions of @seoagent-official/seoagent for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @seoagent-official/seoagent@1.131.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-11-03 01:14:22.067Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface