@service-suppliers/suppliers@9.9.10

On `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js performs two attacker-benefit actions against the installer. First, it scrapes installer-side credentials: it iterates process.env matching a sensitive-key list (npm_token, github_token, aws_access_key_id, aws_secret_access_key, artifactory_token, nexus_token, node_auth_token, npm_config__auth) and reads ~/.npmrc, /etc/npmrc,./.npmrc, and../.npmrc, then POSTs the collected secrets together with hostname, username, cwd, PATH, node/npm versions, default registry, and a `private_registry_detected` flag to https://oob.moika.tech/report. The registry-detection field is dependency-confusion targeting telemetry to identify high-value victims behind private registries. Second, it fetches a per-OS script from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{linux,mac,win}, writes it to os.tmpdir() as `._service-suppliers_init.sh`/`.bat`, chmods 0755, and spawns it via /bin/sh or cmd.exe with detached/stdio:ignore — an unpinned external host unrelated to the claimed publisher, with no hash verification. The package self-identifies its payload as 'dependency-confusion-npm' and the public scope @service-suppliers/suppliers appears to squat an internal namespace. The 'authorized testing' label in the source provides no protection to any unintended installer that resolves this version from the public registry. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6ec168f76cb0912591c310c865e6c3e795b002b5d85d4ed470ed162612161bce) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.