registry / @servicetitan/assist-utils / 1.1.5

@servicetitan/assist-utils@1.1.5

Assist utilities for host-MFE communication

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

npm preinstall fetches and executes an external Bun runtime, which runs an obfuscated payload. The payload contains GitHub-token collection/processing logic and process execution.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package runs the preinstall lifecycle hook.

Impact

Potential theft or misuse of GitHub credentials and arbitrary code execution during dependency installation.

Mechanism

install-time remote runtime download and obfuscated credential-harvesting payload execution

Attack narrative

On npm installation, package.json invokes setup.mjs. That script downloads a platform-specific Bun binary from GitHub if Bun is absent, then executes the unrelated, 727KB obfuscated math_init.js payload. Static inspection of that payload shows child-process execution and GitHub credential-token handling (`ghtoken`, `ghs_old`, `ghs_jwt`), while the advertised source and runtime entrypoint are ordinary React utilities and do not use it.

Rationale

The concealed preinstall downloader/executor is unrelated to the package’s stated functionality, and the executed payload includes credential-token handling. This is a concrete install-time malicious execution chain.

Evidence

package.jsonsetup.mjsmath_init.jsdist/index.js

Network endpoints1

github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/

OSV Corroboration

npm/@servicetitan/assist-utils is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (1b60814bd5ba48f192e0125abe540c910d5d8f9a061c439ca6106d8fb40d7bea) The package declares itself as a small React/MobX hooks library and ships a 222-byte re-export at dist/index.js as its `main`, but its real behavior is in the `preinstall` lifecycle script. `package.json` runs `node setup.mjs`, an obfuscated loader (obfuscator.io-style `_0x*` identifiers, per-function string dictionaries) that downloads the Bun runtime zip from oven-sh's GitHub releases, extracts the `bun` binary to a temp directory, chmods it 0755, and invokes it against the sibling `math_init.js`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB heavily obfuscated bundle (string-array rotation, opcode/dictionary indirection, hex-mangled identifiers) with no source, tests, or documentation and no relation to the advertised React/MobX purpose. Running the payload under Bun rather than Node evades Node-based install-time sandboxing and scanners. The scoped name `@servicetitan/assist-utils` mimics an internal ServiceTitan namespace, consistent with a scope/dependency-confusion delivery. Installing this package results in execution of attacker-controlled, unpinned-to-purpose obfuscated code on the installer's machine at `npm install` time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d9651f3c0b907a7d2ed4b8b8c66c7ac09f79d8d350cad2ee1154795458a42328) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@servicetitan/assist-utils@1.1.5

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code