@servicetitan/eslint-plugin-mobx-6@12.8.17

npm/@servicetitan/eslint-plugin-mobx-6 is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (3384510459af9bf8fc0dd4da84f624210c08581ae687c136ba43969e78caf31a) This package ships an ESLint plugin surface at dist/index.js but its package.json declares scripts.preinstall="node setup.mjs". setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases at install time, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, [join(D, "math_init.js")]) to run a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727 KB Bun-compiled bundle (`// @bun @bun-cjs` header) with heavily obfuscated identifiers, a rotated string/number lookup table (5000+ entries) and a runtime string decoder; dist/index.js never references it. The payload's contents are opaque and disjoint from the advertised ESLint rule code. The package name and scope resemble an internal @servicetitan package (repository field points at github.com/servicetitan/uikit.git) while the install-time behavior is unrelated to any ESLint functionality — consistent with a scope-confusion / trojanized-package shape. Using an alternate JS runtime downloaded at install time to execute a bundled obfuscated blob is a dropper pattern designed to evade Node-based supply-chain scanners; an ESLint plugin has no legitimate need for a Bun-only auto-executed payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (791cb7d8a3c3c7f42fc66abe9ab255c913f496069ff610cb1d8dfea3202403b9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.