registry / @servicetitan/feature-spotlight / 3.9.4

@servicetitan/feature-spotlight@3.9.4

Provides specific styles to Anvil components to highlight a feature

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Installation executes an obfuscated secondary payload. That payload retrieves and evaluates remote code, creating arbitrary install-time execution.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm preinstall

Impact

Remote code can execute with the installing user's permissions.

Mechanism

Bun bootstrap followed by obfuscated remote-payload eval

Attack narrative

npm invokes setup.mjs before installation completes. The script uses an installed Bun or downloads a Bun binary from GitHub, then runs math_init.js. The large obfuscated payload dynamically fetches content, decodes it, and evaluates it, allowing an attacker-controlled remote response to execute during install.

Rationale

This is a concrete preinstall remote-code-execution chain, not behavior needed by the declared UI component package. The benign UI entrypoint does not account for the hidden bootstrap payload.

Evidence

package.jsonsetup.mjsmath_init.jssrc/index.tsdist/index.js

Network endpoints1

github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/

OSV Corroboration

npm/@servicetitan/feature-spotlight is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (f9fe80e5718d5ea9b8e4eb9b7b372e0ee5ab194cb74cd84e9b73957c4a31b49e) Version 3.9.5 of this package declares a preinstall hook (`node setup.mjs`) that fires automatically on `npm install`. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases (https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<platform>.zip), unpacks it to a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file `math_init.js` (execFileSync(bunPath, ['math_init.js'], {cwd: D})). math_init.js is a single-line 727KB heavily obfuscated JavaScript blob (hex-named identifiers, string-array rotator `WV8StW` shifting a large numeric/string constant table) with no exports consumable by the package. The advertised purpose of the package is a small React feature-spotlight UI helper; the shipped `dist/index.js` is only 168 bytes. Executing a 727KB opaque payload through a separately downloaded alternate runtime has no relation to that purpose, and the choice of Bun (rather than the already-present Node interpreter) bypasses Node-based static analysis of the payload. The behavioral shape — legitimate scope, tiny declared library, install-time fetch of an alien runtime to execute an obfuscated sibling payload — matches version-specific injection into an otherwise legitimate npm scope. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f55f32c34612150b92148db1bd894fde4673f9e5c233c6baa79d6a7b7948d6c5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@servicetitan/feature-spotlight@3.9.4

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code