registry / @servicetitan/form / 41.3.4

@servicetitan/form@41.3.4

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

npm installation invokes an obfuscated credential-stealing payload. The installer downloads a Bun runtime if absent, then executes math_init.js.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

npm preinstall

Impact

Credential theft and remote code execution during dependency installation.

Mechanism

downloads and runs an obfuscated payload that harvests credentials, exfiltrates data, and evals remote content

Attack narrative

On npm installation, package.json launches setup.mjs. That script uses an installed Bun or downloads Bun from GitHub, then executes the obfuscated math_init.js. The payload includes AWS credential extraction, GitHub token/session handling, outbound request logic, and eval of returned remote content, enabling silent credential exfiltration and attacker-controlled code execution.

Rationale

This is a concrete unconsented preinstall malware chain, not functionality aligned with a form UI package. The obfuscated payload directly combines credential harvesting, network exfiltration, and remote evaluation.

Evidence

package.jsonsetup.mjsmath_init.js

Network endpoints1

github.com

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

npm/@servicetitan/form is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (7bc89d73a36b37e03c15c201c57eb2130710c9213bbe787e006ec199846cde80) The package advertises itself as a React form UI library but its `preinstall` hook runs `node setup.mjs`, an obfuscator.io-style script (identifiers like `_0x488df8=fs`, `_0x52943e=https`; scrambled key/value maps such as `{QkQej:"--version", TdVzu:"/etc/os-release", gLXYX:"Alpine"}`). setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from `github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<ver>/<arch>.zip`, extracts and chmod +x's the `bun` binary into a temp directory, then executes the sibling file `math_init.js` under that fresh Bun runtime via `execFileSync(bunPath, [math_init.js])`. `math_init.js` is a 727KB `// @bun @bun-cjs` file with a string-array rotation function (`WV8StW`), a >900-entry hex/int decoding table (`n7gIxM`), and mangled identifiers — an opaque payload that cannot be executed by Node and is not reachable by scanners that only inspect Node-resolved code. A React form component library has no legitimate reason to fetch a second language runtime or execute an obfuscated 727KB binary blob at install time. The download-alternate-runtime + execute-obfuscated-sibling chain, combined with deliberate obfuscation of the bootstrap script itself, is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: installing the package auto-runs attacker-authored code on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (14cc1b8c1b86df1e7e936e8014ce6522fd72b8e293d172ee4b67ad42035ecfd7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@servicetitan/form@41.3.4

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code