@servicetitan/marketing-direct-mail-components@20.1.4

npm/@servicetitan/marketing-direct-mail-components is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (66b5091f9e5c3c9b3a5fab722548ad7bead76f6163640d6818d0683ad65184ae) package.json declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temp directory, extracts and chmods the Bun binary, and then invokes it (execFileSync) against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line // @bun @bun-cjs bundle with rotated string-array obfuscation (WV8StW rotator, large n7gIxM constants table, hex-mangled identifiers) and is not referenced by the package's advertised React component API (dist/index.js re-exports the marketing direct-mail components with no path to setup.mjs or math_init.js). Using an alien runtime fetched at install time specifically to execute an opaque, obfuscated in-tree bundle is an alternate-runtime dropper: on npm install, the preinstall hook fires automatically and runs attacker-controlled bytes outside Node's toolchain on the installer's machine. The install-time execution surface is orthogonal to the package's stated purpose (a React UI component library has no need to fetch Bun or run an obfuscated bundle at install), consistent with a compromised republish under a legitimate @servicetitan scope. ## Source: ghsa-malware (453c490b127ac1b800f8398c061077eb0d81dd9ef155294f418d4f28ba989566) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.