registry / @servicetitan/thoughtspot-theme / 1.7.4

@servicetitan/thoughtspot-theme@1.7.4

ServiceTitan ThoughtSpot embed styling, visible actions, and SDK wiring helpers, shared across reporting-embedded and other teams.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

npm installation silently launches an obfuscated second-stage payload. The payload harvests credentials/tokens and uses network requests, including eval of fetched content.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install (preinstall)

Impact

Credential theft and attacker-controlled code execution in the installing user's environment.

Mechanism

downloaded Bun executes obfuscated credential-stealing payload

Attack narrative

The preinstall hook invokes setup.mjs, which uses a local or downloaded Bun binary to execute math_init.js. That large obfuscated payload dynamically loads system APIs, discovers token-bearing sources, sends collected data through network requests, and evals fetched response content. This is unrelated to the published theme runtime.

Rationale

This is concrete unconsented install-time credential theft and remote code execution, not a package-aligned build step. The visible theme code does not justify the concealed preinstall chain.

Evidence

package.jsonsetup.mjsmath_init.jsdist/index.js

Network endpoints1

github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

npm/@servicetitan/thoughtspot-theme is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (f9704c459112f631fe0de107807dc510b36aa86500984936d6d113c440a7adee) Package `@servicetitan/thoughtspot-theme@1.7.5` declares itself as a ThoughtSpot theme-wiring helper but ships an install-time dropper that runs under a freshly-downloaded alternate JavaScript runtime, bypassing Node-based scanning. `package.json` sets `scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs"`. `setup.mjs` uses obfuscated `_0xXXXX` string-lookup identifiers; it attempts to locate a local `bun` binary and otherwise downloads the Bun runtime ZIP from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/...`, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it to 0755, and invokes it via `execFileSync(bunPath, ['math_init.js'], { cwd: D })`. The executed `math_init.js` is a 727KB single-line, string-array-shuffle obfuscated bundle (rotating `WV8StW` shifter over a large `n7gIxM` dictionary with hex/base decoder `hc1jfK9`) whose contents are opaque and unrelated to CSS/theme wiring. `package.json` `files` declares only `dist`, yet both `setup.mjs` and `math_init.js` ship at tarball root and execute during `npm install`; the `dist/index.js` theme code is not reached by the preinstall path. The alternate-runtime dropper shape — install-time fetch of a different language runtime specifically to execute a shipped obfuscated payload the Node scanners cannot read — is the fingerprint of a loader/stealer under a scope-impersonation cover story. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e3d04455baed0f86090c296632f43b4d78f7420860e2090d2ba585728f4355c5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@servicetitan/thoughtspot-theme@1.7.4

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code