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@shuv1337/shuvgrok@1.0.5: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @shuv1337/shuvgrok / 1.0.5

@shuv1337/shuvgrok@1.0.5

ShuvGrok: bring Grok into your terminal

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package automatically mutates the shared upstream Grok home. It places a sibling-package binary there and persists installer/registry settings in the shared config.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install invokes postinstall

Impact

A third-party fork can persist its distribution settings in the upstream Grok control surface and influence subsequent fork-managed updates.

Mechanism

postinstall binary deployment and shared AI-agent config mutation

Policy narrative

On npm install, the package's postinstall hook creates the shared `~/.grok/bin` directory, decompresses or copies an opaque platform sibling binary into it, and writes `cli.installer` plus a registry setting to `~/.grok/config.toml`. The source explicitly acknowledges that this location is shared with `@xai-official/grok`. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent CLI control surface.

Rationale

The source establishes a concrete automatic persistence and configuration-mutation chain in an upstream Grok home, not merely a scanner signature. Lack of direct exfiltration does not mitigate this foreign control-surface write. Product guard normalized a concrete AI-agent control hijack publish_block to the blockable dangerous-capability shape.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/postinstall.jsbin/shuvgrok~/.grok/bin/shuvgrok~/.grok/config.toml

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

25"scripts": { "postinstall": "node bin/postinstall.js" }

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

`postinstall` runs automatically on npm install.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L25

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @shuv1337/shuvgrok@1.0.4 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNodXYxMzM3L3NodXZncm9r:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 910c1c41e996f4e3 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @shuv1337/shuvgrok@1.0.4 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNodXYxMzM3L3NodXZncm9r:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg

9// The binary is deliberately named `shuvgrok`, not `grok`: ~/.grok is shared // with an upstream @xai-official/grok install, and a `grok` symlink there // would collide with it. Only the config file path stays `~/.grok/config.toml` // (read by the Rust side, which is unchanged in this fork).

High

Ai Review Evidence

Install code deliberately uses the upstream Grok home and shared config path.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L9

199// Write installer config. Path stays ~/.grok/config.toml: that is the Rust // side's config location and is intentionally unchanged in this fork. const configDir = GROK_HOME; const configPath = path.join(configDir, 'config.toml'); let obj = {}; try { obj = TOML.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8')); } catch { } obj.cli ??= {}; obj.cli.installer = 'npm'; // Persist the npm registry so `shuvgrok update` and the trampoline use the // same one. const npmRegistry = process.env.GROK_NPM_REGISTRY || (() => { try { const resolved = execSync( 'npm config

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

The lifecycle hook writes `cli.installer` and a registry value into `~/.grok/config.toml`.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L199

71fs.mkdirSync(CANONICAL_DIR, { recursive: true }); function writeVendorBinary(brPath, rawPath, destPath) { const tmp = destPath + `.tmp.${process.pid}`; try { if (fs.existsSync(brPath)) { fs.writeFileSync(tmp, zlib.brotliDecompressSync(fs.readFileSync(brPath))); } else if (fs.existsSync(rawPath)) { fs.copyFileSync(rawPath, tmp); } else { return false; } if (!IS_WINDOWS) fs.chmodSync(tmp, 0o755); fs.renameSync(tmp, destPath);

High

Ai Review Evidence

It silently installs a compressed sibling-package binary into `~/.grok/bin`.

bin/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L71

bin/shuvgrokView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @shuv1337/shuvgrok@1.0.4 matchedPath = bin/shuvgrok matchedIdentity = npm:QHNodXYxMzM3L3NodXZncm9r:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/shuvgrokView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 5-46json

5 "license": "Apache-2.0",

6 "repository": {

7 "type": "git",

8 "url": "git+https://github.com/shuv1337/shuvgrok.git"

9 },

10 "bin": {

11 "shuvgrok": "bin/shuvgrok"

12 },

13 "files": [

14 "bin/"

15 ],

16 "os": [

17 "darwin",

18 "linux",

19 "win32"

20 ],

21 "cpu": [

22 "arm64",

23 "x64"

24 ],

25 "scripts": {

26 "postinstall": "node bin/postinstall.js"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L26

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L26

27 },

High

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

`postinstall` runs automatically on npm install.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L25

28 "publishConfig": {

29 "access": "public"

30 },

31 "engines": {

32 "node": ">=20"

33 },

34 "dependencies": {

35 "@iarna/toml": "^3.0.0"

36 },

37 "optionalDependencies": {

38 "@shuv1337/shuvgrok-darwin-arm64": "1.0.5",

39 "@shuv1337/shuvgrok-darwin-x64": "1.0.5",

40 "@shuv1337/shuvgrok-linux-arm64": "1.0.5",

41 "@shuv1337/shuvgrok-linux-x64": "1.0.5",

42 "@shuv1337/shuvgrok-win32-arm64": "1.0.5",

43 "@shuv1337/shuvgrok-win32-x64": "1.0.5"

44 }

45}

46

bin/postinstall.jsView file

Lines 1-29javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// Runs once after npm install/update. Reads the shuvgrok binary from the

3// matching per-platform optional dependency (@shuv1337/shuvgrok-<platform>)

4// and installs it to ~/.grok/bin/ using versioned filenames:

5//

6// Unix: shuvgrok-<version> + shuvgrok (symlink)

7// Windows: shuvgrok-<version>.exe + shuvgrok.exe (copy)

8//

9// The binary is deliberately named `shuvgrok`, not `grok`: ~/.grok is shared

10// with an upstream @xai-official/grok install, and a `grok` symlink there

bin/shuvgrokView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @shuv1337/shuvgrok@1.0.4 matchedPath = bin/shuvgrok matchedIdentity = npm:QHNodXYxMzM3L3NodXZncm9r:1.0.4 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/shuvgrokView on unpkg