--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@skillsmith/cli/v/0.8.15" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@skillsmith/cli/v/0.8.15.md" package: "@skillsmith/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@skillsmith/cli@0.8.15 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.8.15" --- # @skillsmith/cli@0.8.15 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 20 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Telemetry warning (can be blocked) - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Telemetry - **Selected version:** 0.8.15 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The CLI sends skill-install telemetry by default when an API key is present, unless an environment opt-out is set, and the reviewed documentation does not disclose this event. The payload excludes the raw key and goes to the package's own service, so this is suspicious telemetry rather than credential exfiltration. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-31T13:11:18.944Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-31T13:12:08.044Z - **Download time:** 510 ms - **Static scan time:** 5553 ms - **AI review time:** 43035 ms - **Total time:** 49100 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Undisclosed runtime telemetry reports skill-install activity to the package vendor when a CLI install succeeds or fails; no credential theft or unrelated attack was identified. - **Trigger:** A user runs a CLI skill-install operation while a Skillsmith API key is available and telemetry has not been disabled. - **Impact:** The vendor can associate skill-install activity and outcomes with a pseudonymous account identifier; this is an undisclosed telemetry privacy risk. - **Evidence paths:** dist/cli.js, README.md - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-31T13:12:08.044Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI sends an event containing skill identifier and installation metadata to https://api.skillsmith.app/functions/v1/events, associating it with an HMAC-derived API-key identifier. - **Rationale:** The CLI sends skill-install telemetry by default when an API key is present, unless an environment opt-out is set, and the reviewed documentation does not disclose this event. The payload excludes the raw key and goes to the package's own service, so this is suspicious telemetry rather than credential exfiltration. - **Network endpoints:** https://api.skillsmith.app/functions/v1/events ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 88.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** After a CLI skill installation, the package emits a skill\_install event with skill ID, source, outcome, duration, trust tier, and error code metadata., The event is sent to the package's own api.skillsmith.app events endpoint and uses an HMAC-derived identifier from the Skillsmith API key., The install-event sender only checks for an opt-out flag and presence of an API key; it does not require telemetry to be enabled., The README describes a separate cross-machine inventory feature as opt-in, but does not disclose the automatic skill-install event in the reviewed excerpt., The manifest exposes the bundled CLI as its bin entry; its only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly. - **Evidence against:** The collected event fields are limited to skill-install metadata; the API key itself is not included in the event payload., The actor identifier is HMAC-derived rather than the raw API key., The telemetry helper permits disabling events through SKILLSMITH\_TELEMETRY=0/false/off., Device login sends client metadata to the Skillsmith API, consistent with the package's sign-in flow. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @skillsmith/cli@0.8.15. - Review the evidence and your use of @skillsmith/cli@0.8.15 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L819: import { promisify } from "node:util"; L820: import childProcess from "node:child_process"; L821: var execFile, powerShellPath, executePowerShell; ``` ### 4. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. ### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L214: if (ts.isImportDeclaration(node)) { L215: const importInfo = extractImport(node, relativePath); L216: if (importInfo) { ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L50: function createLoggerInstance(namespace) { L51: const useJson = process.env.LOG_FORMAT === "json"; L52: const minLevel = process.env.LOG_LEVEL ? parseInt(process.env.LOG_LEVEL, 10) : LogLevel.WARN; ... L815: L816: // ../../node_modules/powershell-utils/index.js L817: import process5 from "node:process"; ... L850: ]; L851: executePowerShell.encodeCommand = (command) => Buffer2.from(command, "utf16le").toString("base64"); L852: executePowerShell.escapeArgument = (value) => `'${String(value).replaceAll("'", "''")}'`; ... L932: const command = String.raw`(Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Associations\UrlAssociations\http\UserChoice").ProgId`; L933: const { stdout } = await executePowerShell(command, { powerShellPath: psPath }); L934: return stdout.trim(); ``` ### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: "claude-code": join(homedir(), ".claude", "skills"), dir: join(homedir(), ".claude", "agents"), dir: join(homedir(), ".claude", "agents"), // `.claude/agents`)") -- this codebase already has independently dir: join(homedir(), ".claude", "agents"), dir: join(homedir(), ".claude", "agents"), dir: join(homedir(), ".claude", "agents"), dir: join(homedir(), ".claude", "agents"), ``` ### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L50: function createLoggerInstance(namespace) { L51: const useJson = process.env.LOG_FORMAT === "json"; L52: const minLevel = process.env.LOG_LEVEL ? parseInt(process.env.LOG_LEVEL, 10) : LogLevel.WARN; ... L815: L816: // ../../node_modules/powershell-utils/index.js L817: import process5 from "node:process"; ... L850: ]; L851: executePowerShell.encodeCommand = (command) => Buffer2.from(command, "utf16le").toString("base64"); L852: executePowerShell.escapeArgument = (value) => `'${String(value).replaceAll("'", "''")}'`; ... L932: const command = String.raw`(Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Associations\UrlAssociations\http\UserChoice").ProgId`; L933: const { stdout } = await executePowerShell(command, { powerShellPath: psPath }); L934: return stdout.trim(); ``` ### 12. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L50: function createLoggerInstance(namespace) { L51: const useJson = process.env.LOG_FORMAT === "json"; L52: const minLevel = process.env.LOG_LEVEL ? parseInt(process.env.LOG_LEVEL, 10) : LogLevel.WARN; ... L815: L816: // ../../node_modules/powershell-utils/index.js L817: import process5 from "node:process"; ... L850: ]; L851: executePowerShell.encodeCommand = (command) => Buffer2.from(command, "utf16le").toString("base64"); L852: executePowerShell.escapeArgument = (value) => `'${String(value).replaceAll("'", "''")}'`; ... L932: const command = String.raw`(Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Associations\UrlAssociations\http\UserChoice").ProgId`; L933: const { stdout } = await executePowerShell(command, { powerShellPath: psPath }); L934: return stdout.trim(); ``` ### 13. High: External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: extractskillid: () => "config set", extractframework: () => "cli" }); function createconfigcommand2() { const config2 = new command27("config").description( "get or set skillsmith configuration values (~/.skillsmith/config.json)" ); config2.command("get ").description("read a configuration value (e.g. `audit_mode`)").action(configgetaction); config2.command("set ").description("write a configuration value (atomic; tier-revalidated for audit_mode)").action(configsetaction); return config2; } import { command as command28 } from "commander"; import { existssync as existssync33, copyfilesync as copyfiles ``` ### 14. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L50: function createLoggerInstance(namespace) { L51: const useJson = process.env.LOG_FORMAT === "json"; L52: const minLevel = process.env.LOG_LEVEL ? parseInt(process.env.LOG_LEVEL, 10) : LogLevel.WARN; ... L815: L816: // ../../node_modules/powershell-utils/index.js L817: import process5 from "node:process"; ... L850: ]; L851: executePowerShell.encodeCommand = (command) => Buffer2.from(command, "utf16le").toString("base64"); L852: executePowerShell.escapeArgument = (value) => `'${String(value).replaceAll("'", "''")}'`; ... L932: const command = String.raw`(Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Associations\UrlAssociations\http\UserChoice").ProgId`; L933: const { stdout } = await executePowerShell(command, { powe ``` ### 15. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L50: function createLoggerInstance(namespace) { L51: const useJson = process.env.LOG_FORMAT === "json"; L52: const minLevel = process.env.LOG_LEVEL ? parseInt(process.env.LOG_LEVEL, 10) : LogLevel.WARN; ... L815: L816: // ../../node_modules/powershell-utils/index.js L817: import process5 from "node:process"; ... L850: ]; L851: executePowerShell.encodeCommand = (command) => Buffer2.from(command, "utf16le").toString("base64"); L852: executePowerShell.escapeArgument = (value) => `'${String(value).replaceAll("'", "''")}'`; ... L932: const command = String.raw`(Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Associations\UrlAssociations\http\UserChoice").ProgId`; L933: const { stdout } = await executePo ``` ### 16. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 17. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 18. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 19. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** templates/skill-telemetry.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = templates/sk[redacted] kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 6902 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 20. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 21 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 1 - **Development dependencies:** 5 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 22 ### Published dependency entries - @inquirer/prompts 7.10.1 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/api 1.9.1 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/instrumentation-http 0.222.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/instrumentation-runtime-node 0.35.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/instrumentation-undici 0.32.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/resources 2.11.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/sdk-node 0.222.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/sdk-trace-base 2.11.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/semantic-conventions 1.43.0 (Dependency) - chalk 6.0.0 (Dependency) - chokidar 5.0.0 (Dependency) - cli-table3 0.6.5 (Dependency) - commander 14.0.3 (Dependency) - fts5-sql-bundle 1.0.2 (Dependency) - open 11.0.0 (Dependency) - ora 9.4.1 (Dependency) - posthog-node 5.47.3 (Dependency) - tree-sitter-wasms 0.1.13 (Dependency) - typescript 5.9.3 (Dependency) - web-tree-sitter 0.25.10 (Dependency) - yaml 2.9.1 (Dependency) - @smith-horn/enterprise ^0.3.12 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @skillsmith/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.8.15 - **License:** Elastic-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-10-09T03:54:12.775Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T03:00:44.110Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-31T13:12:25.748Z - **Known versions:** 12 - **Latest version:** 0.8.16 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** A registry for sharing, scanning, and tracking agent skills across teams. - **Maintainers:** wrsmith108 - **Keywords:** skillsmith, ai, skills, agent-skills, mcp, llm, cli, claude-code, cursor, copilot, skill-management - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.22.0 - **Artifact files:** 9 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,362,613 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()