@slopus/rig@0.0.6
Opinionated pi fork with strong defaults for coding-agent workflows.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiDirect inspection shows a package-aligned, explicitly invoked coding-agent CLI rather than install-time or covert attack behavior. Scanner hits are explained by legitimate clipboard integration, local daemon setup, provider requests, and bundled web assets.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare hook.
- dist/main.js only invokes the CLI application after explicit execution.
- dist/app/readClipboardImage.js reads clipboard images on demand and writes them to a rig temp directory; no network use.
- dist/providers/requestAnthropicMessage.js sends authenticated model requests only to configured Anthropic API endpoints.
- dist/tools/claude/webFetch/ restricts redirect handling and uses user-invoked web tooling.
- The flagged Unicode in dist/web/assets/index-D5rSlaXz.js is bundled UI/library text, not concealed executable control flow.
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/app/readClipboardImage.jsView on unpkg · L70Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/tools/utils/prepareImageForClaude.jsView on unpkg · L5Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @slopus/rig@0.0.6.
See all versions of @slopus/rig for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @slopus/rig@0.0.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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