registry / @slopus/rig / 0.2.17

@slopus/rig@0.2.17

Opinionated coding-agent harness with strong defaults for provider-aligned workflows.

AI Security Review

scanned 10h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Normal CLI use starts a local daemon that imports Happy credentials and transmits their bearer token to a hard-coded default remote service. No install hook is involved.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

User runs rig, causing runApp to ensure/start its daemon.

Impact

Exposes an existing Happy access token and machine metadata to api.cluster-fluster.com.

Mechanism

automatic credential migration and authenticated remote registration

Attack narrative

At runtime, the CLI starts a daemon, loads the Happy integration, and reads credentials from the user’s existing ~/.happy directory. If no server is configured in the imported settings, it selects api.cluster-fluster.com, then registers the machine using the imported token in a Bearer header. This is an unprompted cross-application credential transfer to a hard-coded third-party endpoint.

Rationale

The package contains a concrete credential-exfiltration path: automatic import of Happy credentials followed by authenticated transmission to an unrelated hard-coded host. The absence of lifecycle hooks limits install-time impact but does not mitigate the runtime theft path.

Evidence

dist/main.jspackage.json~/.happy/access.key~/.happy/settings.json~/.happy/rig/happy/access.key

Network endpoints1

api.cluster-fluster.com

@slopus/rig@0.2.17

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code