registry  /  @snippyly/plugin  /  1.0.239

@snippyly/plugin@1.0.239

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. Runtime network and storage behavior is expected for a browser collaboration/comment toolbar.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Browser imports/loads the plugin or embeds snippyly-plugin/superflow toolbar.
Impact
No unconsented install-time execution or credential/file exfiltration identified.
Mechanism
browser custom element toolbar with remote SDK loading and user-invoked collaboration features
Rationale
Static inspection shows a bundled browser plugin for Superflow/Velt with package-aligned network, DOM, storage, and optional screen-share/comment features. Suspicious scanner hits are explained by bundled Firebase/Lit/browser code and hardcoded public project/API identifiers, not malware behavior.
Evidence
package.jsonsnippyly.jssnippyly.min.js
Network endpoints6
cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@veltdev/sdk@<version>/velt.jsus-central1-snipply-sdk-staging.cloudfunctions.net/getprivatenpmpackagefileapp.usesuperflow.comdrive.usesuperflow.comwww.usesuperflow.comdrive.google.com/uc

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 87.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • snippyly.js dynamically injects Velt SDK script from jsdelivr or staging cloudfunctions at runtime.
  • snippyly.js uses browser storage/cookies and optional screen capture flows for toolbar/comment features.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks and main is snippyly.js.
  • snippyly.js/snippyly.min.js are browser toolbar bundles defining superflow-toolbar/snippyly-plugin custom elements.
  • No child_process, filesystem writes, native binary loading, or Node credential harvesting found.
  • Network calls/endpoints are aligned with Superflow/Velt/Firebase toolbar, auth, comments, screenshots, and assets.
  • Screen capture requires browser getDisplayMedia/user permission and attaches screenshots to comments via the Velt comment API.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetwork
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 2 file(s), 1.18 MB of source, external domains: apis.google.com, app.usesuperflow.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, cdn.velt.dev, drive.google.com, firebasestorage.googleapis.com, fonts.googleapis.com, join.slack.com, us-central1-snipply-sdk-staging.cloudfunctions.net, us-central1-snippyly-sdk-prod.cloudfunctions.net, www.apache.org, www.google.com, www.usesuperflow.com, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source
snippyly.min.jsView file
1545patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 1545 matchedText = calc(${t...d=a`
High
High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

snippyly.min.jsView on unpkg · L1545
1545patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 1545 matchedText = calc(${t...d=a`
High
Secret Pattern

Google API key in snippyly.min.js

snippyly.min.jsView on unpkg · L1545
snippyly.jsView file
1545patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 1545 matchedText = calc(${t...d=r`
High
Secret Pattern

Google API key in snippyly.js

snippyly.jsView on unpkg · L1545

Findings

3 High2 Medium3 Low
HighHigh Secretsnippyly.min.js
HighSecret Patternsnippyly.min.js
HighSecret Patternsnippyly.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings