registry / @solongate/proxy / 0.77.0

@solongate/proxy@0.77.0

AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. Explicit `login` installs SolonGate-owned hooks into Claude Code's global settings and may alter shell profiles. The installed guard periodically downloads newer hook code from the package service, and audit hooks transmit tool-call metadata.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

User runs `solongate login` and completes device authorization; installed Claude Code hooks then run during tool events.

Impact

A trusted SolonGate service can update globally executed hook code and receives audited tool arguments for enrolled users.

Mechanism

Global Claude hook registration, cloud policy/audit requests, and authenticated hook self-update.

Rationale

Source inspection confirms an explicit, first-party global AI-agent extension lifecycle with remote hook updates and audit uploads. It does not show unconsented lifecycle execution, credential theft, or a concrete malicious payload chain.

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.jsdist/login.jsdist/global-install.jshooks/guard.mjshooks/audit.mjshooks/shield.mjshooks/stop.mjs~/.claude/settings.json~/.claude/settings.solongate.bak~/.solongate/cloud-guard.json~/.solongate/hooks/guard.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/audit.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/shield.mjs~/.bashrc~/.zshrc~/.profile

Network endpoints4

api.solongate.com/api/v1/hooks/guardapi.solongate.com/api/v1/policies/activeapi.solongate.com/api/v1/audit-logsapi.anthropic.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

`hooks/guard.mjs` self-updates installed hooks from the cloud and atomically replaces `~/.solongate/hooks/*.mjs`.
`dist/global-install.js` writes global Claude Code hooks into `~/.claude/settings.json` and can add a `claude` shell shim.
`hooks/audit.mjs` sends tool names and bounded tool arguments to the configured SolonGate API.
`hooks/shield.mjs` proxies Anthropic traffic locally and launches an explicitly supplied command.

Evidence against

`package.json` has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or other lifecycle hook.
`dist/index.js` dispatches global installation only for explicit `login`; ordinary import does not invoke it.
`dist/login.js` requires an interactive device authorization before global enforcement setup.
Network endpoints and credential handling are aligned with the package's documented security-service functionality.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsObfuscatedUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 17 file(s), 1.54 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.solongate.com, cdn.solongate.com, dashboard.solongate.com, solongate.com

Source & flagged code

12 flagged

dist/shield.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1// src/shield.ts

2import { createServer, request as httpRequest } from "http";

3import { request as httpsRequest } from "https";

4import { spawn } from "child_process";

5import { URL } from "url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/shield.jsView on unpkg · L3

6import { readFileSync, existsSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "fs";

7import { resolve } from "path";

8import { homedir } from "os";

9var log = (...a) => process.stderr.write(`[SolonGate shield] ${a.map(String).join(" ")}

10`);

11var DLP_PATTERNS = [

12 { name: "AWS access key", re: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/g },

13 { name: "private key block", re: /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/g },

14 { name: "Anthropic key", re: /sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g },

15 { name: "OpenAI key", re: /sk-(proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g },

16 { name: "GitHub token", re: /gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g },

17 { name: "GitHub fine-grained PAT", re: /github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}/g },

18 { name: "GitLab token", re: /glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g },

19 { name: "Slack token", re: /xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g },

20 { name: "Stripe key", re: /[sr]k_(live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g },

21 { name: "SendGrid key", re: /SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g },

22 { name: "Twilio key", re: /SK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}/g },

23 { name: "npm token", re: /npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}/g },

Lines 249-289javascript

249 }

250 });

251 });

252 return new Promise((resolveP) => {

253 server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {

254 const addr = server.address();

255 const

dist/lib.jsView file

Lines 22-62javascript

22 }

23 return to;

24};

25var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__getProtoOf(mod)) : {}, __copyProps(

dist/audit/index.jsView file

Lines 1375-1415javascript

1375 title,

1376 status: "PARTIAL",

1377 evidence,

1378 summary: `${totalIssues} risky package install(s) \u2014 low frequency.`,

1379 details: "Some packages installed without pinned versions, but at low frequency. Review and pin specific versions.",

1380 recommendation: "Pin all package versions. Add deny-undeclared-default rule. Add tool allowlist."

dist/index.jsView file

9679__dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); L9680: HOOKS_DIR = resolve4(__dirname, "..", "hooks"); L9681: SHIM_BEGIN = "# >>> SolonGate shield (auto secret redaction) >>>"; ... L9687: var login_exports = {}; L9688: import { spawn as spawn2 } from "child_process"; L9689: function startSpinner(text) { L9690: if (!process.stderr.isTTY) { L9691: process.stderr.write(` ${text} L9692: `);

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L9679

41try { L42: const p = join(homedir(), ".solongate", "cloud-guard.json"); L43: if (!existsSync(p)) return {}; L44: const c2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(p, "utf-8")); L45: return c2 && typeof c2 === "object" ? c2 : {}; ... L52: if (!resolvedId) { L53: const listRes = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/v1/policies`, { L54: headers: { "Authorization": `Bearer ${apiKey}` }, ... L120: const resBody = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L121: process.stderr.write(`[SolonGate] Audit log rejected (${res.status}): ${resBody} L122: `); ... L262: if (!apiKey) {

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

41Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/audit/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L41: try { L42: const p = join(homedir(), ".solongate", "cloud-guard.json"); L43: if (!existsSync(p)) return {}; L44: const c2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(p, "utf-8")); L45: return c2 && typeof c2 === "object" ? c2 : {}; ... L52: if (!resolvedId) { L53: const listRes = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/v1/policies`, { L54: headers: { "Authorization": `Bearer ${apiKey}` }, ... L120: const resBody = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L121: process.stderr.write(`[SolonGate] Audit log rejected (${res.status}): ${resBody} L122: `); ... L262: if (!apiKey) {

hooks/guard.mjsView file

13* - API_KEY (sg_live_…/sg_test_…) from env/.env, attached to every API call. L14: * - API_URL defaults to https://api.solongate.com. L15: * - Enforcement is gated on the API key (the key identifies the project + ... L19: * L20: * Exit code 2 = BLOCK, exit code 0 = ALLOW. L21: * Logs DENY decisions to SolonGate Cloud. ALLOWs are logged by audit.mjs. ... L24: import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs'; L25: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path'; L27: import { homedir } from 'node:os'; L28: import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib'; L29: import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

dist/tui/index.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.76.1 matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.76.1 similarity = 0.941 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

12 flagged · loading source

dist/shield.jsView file

3import { request as httpsRequest } from "https"; L4: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L5: import { URL } from "url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/shield.jsView on unpkg · L3

269log(`redacting secrets on the LLM path \u2192 masking before ${upstream.host} (127.0.0.1:${port})`); L270: const child = spawn(cmd[0], cmd.slice(1), { L271: stdio: "inherit", L272: env: { ...process.env, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}` }, L273: shell: process.platform === "win32"

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/shield.jsView on unpkg · L269

dist/lib.jsView file

6541/\bbash\s+-c\b/i, L6542: // Subshell wrapper: bash -c L6543: /\bsh\s+-c\b/i,

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L6541

42try { L43: JSON.parse(str); L44: return true; ... L2982: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2983: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2984: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4515: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4516: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4517: if (deprecation) { ... L5075: handle: "!!", L5076: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5077: }]

High

Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

dist/audit/index.jsView file

1395var DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [ L1396: { pattern: /eval\s*\(/, label: "eval() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" }, L1397: { pattern: /\bexec\s*\(/, label: "exec() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" },

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/audit/index.jsView on unpkg · L1395

dist/index.jsView file

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L9679

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

10453const pm = detectPackageManager(); L10454: const cmd = pm === "yarn" ? "yarn add @solongate/proxy" : `${pm} install @solongate/proxy`; L10455: log3(` Installing @solongate/proxy via ${pm}...`); L10456: try { L10457: execSync(cmd, { stdio: "pipe", cwd: process.cwd() }); L10458: return true;

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L10453

hooks/guard.mjsView file

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

dist/tui/index.jsView file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg

Findings

1 Critical9 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/tui/index.js

HighChild Processdist/shield.js

HighShelldist/lib.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/shield.js

HighCredential Exfiltrationdist/lib.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js

HighCloud Metadata Accesshooks/guard.mjs

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/index.js

HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/lib.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/audit/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowObfuscated

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

88%Warn

Verdict confidence

IntentDangerous Capability

TypeAgent extension lifecycle risk

False-positive riskLow

Review stagesource_first_review

Firewall policyWarn-only agent extension risk

Package metadata

npm

AuthorSolonGate

Maintainerscodeyevsky

Version0.80.0

PublishedJul 12, 2026

LicenseMIT

Dependencies6

Integrityverified

Package size392 KB

Files126

Keywordsai-tool-securityai-tool-proxysecurityproxygatewayfirewallai-securitytool-security

LinksRepository Homepage Issues

Runtime surface

package.json

Entrypointsmain → ./dist/lib.jstypes → ./dist/lib.d.tsexports mapbin → proxy, solongate, solongate-audit +1

Runtimenode >=18.0.0

Artifact1.65 MB · 126 files1 signature(s)

Install lifecycleNo install hooks · other: build, build:hooks, build:types, clean +2

Behavioral surface

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellHighEntropyStringsObfuscatedUrlStringsManifest: clean