registry / @solongate/proxy / 0.81.7

@solongate/proxy@0.81.7

AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. Explicit `login` installs Claude Code command hooks and shell shims. On later tool calls, the guard can fetch and replace those installed hook scripts from the configured SolonGate API.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

User runs `solongate login` without `--no-install`, then uses Claude Code tools.

Impact

A compromised or malicious configured API endpoint could update persistent local hook code; normal operation also transmits tool arguments to SolonGate.

Mechanism

first-party AI-agent hook installation with server-controlled self-update and audit telemetry

Rationale

No unconsented npm lifecycle behavior or concrete malicious payload is present. However, explicit login installs broad AI-agent hooks that self-update from a network endpoint without an independent authenticity mechanism, so the package warrants a warning rather than a block.

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.jsdist/login.jsdist/global-install.jshooks/guard.mjshooks/audit.mjs~/.claude/settings.json~/.solongate/hooks/guard.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/audit.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/shield.mjs

Network endpoints4

api.solongate.com/api/v1/hooks/guardapi.solongate.com/api/v1/hooks/auditapi.solongate.com/api/v1/hooks/shieldapi.solongate.com/api/v1/audit-logs

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

`dist/login.js` runs a global installer after explicit `login` unless `--no-install` is supplied.
`dist/global-install.js` writes Claude hooks into `~/.claude/settings.json` and shell-profile shims.
`hooks/guard.mjs` downloads hook JavaScript and atomically replaces installed hook files; its hash comes from the same server.
`hooks/audit.mjs` sends tool names and arguments to the configured SolonGate API by default.

Evidence against

`package.json` has no `preinstall`, `install`, or `postinstall` lifecycle hook.
`dist/index.js` dispatches installation only for the user-invoked `login` command.
`dist/login.js` offers `--no-install`, and `logout` calls the restoration path.
Network use and audit logging align with the advertised proxy/security product behavior.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsObfuscatedUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 17 file(s), 1.63 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.solongate.com, cdn.solongate.com, dashboard.solongate.com, solongate.com

Source & flagged code

15 flagged

dist/tui/index.jsView file

Lines 1956-1996javascript

1956 setNewName(v.trim());

1957 setAdding("re");

1958 }

1959 }

1960 ) : /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(

1961 TextInput3,

1962 {

1963 value: newRe,

1964 onChange: setNewRe,

1965 onSubmit: (v) => {

1966 if (v.trim() && dlp) mutate({ ...dlp, custom: [...dlp.custom, { name: newName, re: v.trim() }] });

1967 setAdding(null);

1968 }

1969 }

1970 )

1971 ] }) : null,

1972 adding === "re" ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(RegexTest, { re: newRe }) : null,

1973 status ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Box5, { marginTop: 1, children: /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: status.startsWith("\u2717") ? theme.bad : theme.ok, children: status }) }) : null

1974 ] }) : null });

1975}

1976var SAMPLES = ["AKIA1234567890ABCD00", "sk-ant-api03-xxxxxxxx", "ghp_16chars0000000000000000000000000000", "password=hunter2", "Bearer eyJhbGciOi"];

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L1976

1977function RegexTest({ re }) {

1978 if (!re.trim()) return /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: theme.dim, children: " regex: type a pattern\u2026" });

1979 let rx = null;

1980 let err = "";

1981 try {

1982 rx = new RegExp(re);

1983 } catch (e) {

1984 err = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);

1985 }

1986 if (!rx) return /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: theme.bad, children: ` \u2717 invalid: ${err.slice(0, 50)}` });

1987 const hits = SAMPLES.filter((s) => rx.test(s));

1988 return /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs5(Text5, { wrap: "truncate", children: [

1989 /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: theme.ok, children: " \u2713 valid" }),

1990 /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: theme.dim, children: hits.length ? ` matches ${hits.length}/${SAMPLES.length} samples: ${hits.map((h) => h.slice(0, 8)).join(", ")}` : " (no sample match \u2014 will only catch your custom secrets)" })

1991 ] });

1992}

1993

1994// src/tui/panels/Stats.tsx

1995import { Box as Box6, Text as Text6 } from "ink";

1996import { jsx as jsx6, jsxs as jsxs6 } from "react/jsx-runtime";

1976patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 1976 matchedText = var SAMP...i"];

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in dist/tui/index.js

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L1976

dist/shield.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1// src/shield.ts

2import { createServer, request as httpRequest } from "http";

3import { request as httpsRequest } from "https";

4import { spawn } from "child_process";

5import { URL } from "url";

High

Child Process

dist/lib.jsView file

Lines 22-62javascript

22 }

23 return to;

24};

25var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__getProtoOf(mod)) : {}, __copyProps(

dist/audit/index.jsView file

Lines 1375-1415javascript

1375 title,

1376 status: "PARTIAL",

1377 evidence,

1378 summary: `${totalIssues} risky package install(s) \u2014 low frequency.`,

1379 details: "Some packages installed without pinned versions, but at low frequency. Review and pin specific versions.",

1380 recommendation: "Pin all package versions. Add deny-undeclared-default rule. Add tool allowlist."

dist/index.jsView file

8642patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 8642 matchedText = SAMPLES ...i"];

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in dist/index.js

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L8642

10623__dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); L10624: HOOKS_DIR = resolve4(__dirname, "..", "hooks"); L10625: SHIM_BEGIN = "# >>> SolonGate shield (auto secret redaction) >>>"; ... L10631: var login_exports = {}; L10632: import { spawn as spawn2 } from "child_process"; L10633: function startSpinner(text) { L10634: if (!process.stderr.isTTY) { L10635: process.stderr.write(` ${text} L10636: `);

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L10623

41try { L42: const p = join(homedir(), ".solongate", "cloud-guard.json"); L43: if (!existsSync(p)) return {}; L44: const c2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(p, "utf-8")); L45: return c2 && typeof c2 === "object" ? c2 : {}; ... L52: if (!resolvedId) { L53: const listRes = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/v1/policies`, { L54: headers: { "Authorization": `Bearer ${apiKey}` }, ... L120: const resBody = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L121: process.stderr.write(`[SolonGate] Audit log rejected (${res.status}): ${resBody} L122: `); ... L262: if (!apiKey) {

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

hooks/guard.mjsView file

13* - API_KEY (sg_live_…/sg_test_…) from env/.env, attached to every API call. L14: * - API_URL defaults to https://api.solongate.com. L15: * - Enforcement is gated on the API key (the key identifies the project + ... L19: * L20: * Exit code 2 = BLOCK, exit code 0 = ALLOW. L21: * Logs DENY decisions to SolonGate Cloud. ALLOWs are logged by audit.mjs. ... L24: import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs'; L25: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path'; L27: import { homedir } from 'node:os'; L28: import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib'; L29: import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

dist/login.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.81.6 matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.81.6 similarity = 0.882 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/login.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

15 flagged · loading source

dist/tui/index.jsView file

1976patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 1976 matchedText = var SAMP...i"];

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L1976

1976patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 1976 matchedText = var SAMP...i"];

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in dist/tui/index.js

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L1976

dist/shield.jsView file

3import { request as httpsRequest } from "https"; L4: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L5: import { URL } from "url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/shield.jsView on unpkg · L3

269log(`redacting secrets on the LLM path \u2192 masking before ${upstream.host} (127.0.0.1:${port})`); L270: const child = spawn(cmd[0], cmd.slice(1), { L271: stdio: "inherit", L272: env: { ...process.env, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}` }, L273: shell: process.platform === "win32"

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/shield.jsView on unpkg · L269

dist/lib.jsView file

6541/\bbash\s+-c\b/i, L6542: // Subshell wrapper: bash -c L6543: /\bsh\s+-c\b/i,

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L6541

42try { L43: JSON.parse(str); L44: return true; ... L2982: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2983: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2984: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4515: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4516: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4517: if (deprecation) { ... L5075: handle: "!!", L5076: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5077: }]

High

Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

dist/audit/index.jsView file

1395var DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [ L1396: { pattern: /eval\s*\(/, label: "eval() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" }, L1397: { pattern: /\bexec\s*\(/, label: "exec() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" },

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/audit/index.jsView on unpkg · L1395

dist/index.jsView file

8642patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 8642 matchedText = SAMPLES ...i"];

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in dist/index.js

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L8642

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L10623

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

41Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/audit/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L41: try { L42: const p = join(homedir(), ".solongate", "cloud-guard.json"); L43: if (!existsSync(p)) return {}; L44: const c2 = JSON.parse(readFileSync(p, "utf-8")); L45: return c2 && typeof c2 === "object" ? c2 : {}; ... L52: if (!resolvedId) { L53: const listRes = await fetch(`${apiUrl}/api/v1/policies`, { L54: headers: { "Authorization": `Bearer ${apiKey}` }, ... L120: const resBody = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L121: process.stderr.write(`[SolonGate] Audit log rejected (${res.status}): ${resBody} L122: `); ... L262: if (!apiKey) {

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

11397const pm = detectPackageManager(); L11398: const cmd = pm === "yarn" ? "yarn add @solongate/proxy" : `${pm} install @solongate/proxy`; L11399: log3(` Installing @solongate/proxy via ${pm}...`); L11400: try { L11401: execSync(cmd, { stdio: "pipe", cwd: process.cwd() }); L11402: return true;

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11397

hooks/guard.mjsView file

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

dist/login.jsView file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/login.jsView on unpkg

Findings

4 Critical9 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalCritical Secretdist/tui/index.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/login.js

CriticalSecret Patterndist/tui/index.js

CriticalSecret Patterndist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/shield.js

HighShelldist/lib.js

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/shield.js

HighCredential Exfiltrationdist/lib.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js

HighCloud Metadata Accesshooks/guard.mjs

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/index.js

HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/lib.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/audit/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowObfuscated

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

90%Warn

Verdict confidence

IntentDangerous Capability

TypeAgent extension lifecycle risk

False-positive riskMedium

Review stagesource_first_review

Firewall policyWarn-only agent extension risk

Package metadata

npm

AuthorSolonGate

Maintainerscodeyevsky

Version0.81.11

PublishedJul 14, 2026

LicenseMIT

Dependencies6

Integrityverified

Package size415 KB

Files136

Keywordsai-tool-securityai-tool-proxysecurityproxygatewayfirewallai-securitytool-security

LinksRepository Homepage Issues

Runtime surface

package.json

Entrypointsmain → ./dist/lib.jstypes → ./dist/lib.d.tsexports mapbin → proxy, solongate, solongate-audit +1

Runtimenode >=18.0.0

Artifact1.74 MB · 136 files1 signature(s)

Install lifecycleNo install hooks · other: build, build:hooks, build:types, clean +2

Behavioral surface

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellHighEntropyStringsObfuscatedUrlStringsManifest: clean

Source & flagged code

15 flagged

dist/tui/index.jsView file

Lines 1956-1996javascript

1956 setNewName(v.trim());

1957 setAdding("re");

1958 }

1959 }

1960 ) : /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(

1961 TextInput3,

1962 {

1963 value: newRe,

1964 onChange: setNewRe,

1965 onSubmit: (v) => {

1966 if (v.trim() && dlp) mutate({ ...dlp, custom: [...dlp.custom, { name: newName, re: v.trim() }] });

1967 setAdding(null);

1968 }

1969 }

1970 )

1971 ] }) : null,

1972 adding === "re" ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(RegexTest, { re: newRe }) : null,

1973 status ? /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Box5, { marginTop: 1, children: /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: status.startsWith("\u2717") ? theme.bad : theme.ok, children: status }) }) : null

1974 ] }) : null });

1975}

1976var SAMPLES = ["AKIA1234567890ABCD00", "sk-ant-api03-xxxxxxxx", "ghp_16chars0000000000000000000000000000", "password=hunter2", "Bearer eyJhbGciOi"];

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L1976

1977function RegexTest({ re }) {

1978 if (!re.trim()) return /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: theme.dim, children: " regex: type a pattern\u2026" });

1979 let rx = null;

1980 let err = "";

1981 try {

1982 rx = new RegExp(re);

1983 } catch (e) {

1984 err = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);

1985 }

1986 if (!rx) return /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: theme.bad, children: ` \u2717 invalid: ${err.slice(0, 50)}` });

1987 const hits = SAMPLES.filter((s) => rx.test(s));

1988 return /* @__PURE__ */ jsxs5(Text5, { wrap: "truncate", children: [

1989 /* @__PURE__ */ jsx5(Text5, { color: theme.ok, children: " \u2713 valid" }),

1991 ] });

1992}

1993

1994// src/tui/panels/Stats.tsx

1995import { Box as Box6, Text as Text6 } from "ink";

1996import { jsx as jsx6, jsxs as jsxs6 } from "react/jsx-runtime";

1976patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 1976 matchedText = var SAMP...i"];

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in dist/tui/index.js

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L1976

dist/shield.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1// src/shield.ts

2import { createServer, request as httpRequest } from "http";

3import { request as httpsRequest } from "https";

4import { spawn } from "child_process";

5import { URL } from "url";

High

Child Process

dist/lib.jsView file

Lines 22-62javascript

22 }

23 return to;

24};

25var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__getProtoOf(mod)) : {}, __copyProps(

dist/audit/index.jsView file

Lines 1375-1415javascript

1375 title,

1376 status: "PARTIAL",

1377 evidence,

1378 summary: `${totalIssues} risky package install(s) \u2014 low frequency.`,

1379 details: "Some packages installed without pinned versions, but at low frequency. Review and pin specific versions.",

1380 recommendation: "Pin all package versions. Add deny-undeclared-default rule. Add tool allowlist."

dist/index.jsView file

8642patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 8642 matchedText = SAMPLES ...i"];

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in dist/index.js

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L8642

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L10623

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L41

hooks/guard.mjsView file

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

dist/login.jsView file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/login.jsView on unpkg