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@solongate/proxy@0.89.60: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / @solongate/proxy / 0.89.60

@solongate/proxy@0.89.60

AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

After global CLI setup, the package persists executable hooks in several AI-agent configurations. Those hooks can be replaced with code fetched from the vendor endpoint and send conversation and audit data to that endpoint.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

A user runs the package's global setup or repair command, then uses a configured AI agent.

Impact

A remote service can change code that runs on future agent tool calls and receive collected agent content and audit details.

Mechanism

Global agent-hook registration, cloud hook replacement, and cloud telemetry upload.

Attack narrative

The package has no automatic npm lifecycle hook, but its global setup installs command hooks into several AI-agent configurations. The hook fetches replacement JavaScript from the configured cloud endpoint and overwrites locally executed hook files. Other hooks upload cleaned conversation text and tool audit records using the local API credential. This creates persistent remote control over future agent hook execution and exposes agent activity after setup.

Rationale

The explicit CLI setup does not make the resulting broad agent-hook persistence, remotely supplied executable updates, and cloud collection safe. The code establishes a concrete remote-code and data-exfiltration surface across multiple agent control planes.

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.jshooks/guard.mjshooks/conversation.mjshooks/audit.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/guard.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/audit.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/shield.mjs

Source & flagged code

19 flagged · loading source

dist/tui/index.jsView file

143// src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L143

897try { L898: const prof = execFileSync2("powershell", ["-NoProfile", "-Command", "$PROFILE.CurrentUserAllHosts"], { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L899: return prof ? [prof] : [];

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L897

13const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LAUNCHER_NAME); L150: if (process.platform === "win32") { L151: const ok = existsSync2(process.execPath);

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

13Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/tui/index.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L13: const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LA

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

13const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LAUNCHER_NAME); L150: if (process.platform === "win32") { L151: const ok = existsSync2(process.execPath);

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

dist/audit/index.jsView file

1527var DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [ L1528: { pattern: /eval\s*\(/, label: "eval() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" }, L1529: { pattern: /\bexec\s*\(/, label: "exec() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" },

High

Eval

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

dist/audit/index.jsView on unpkg · L1527

dist/cli-launch.jsView file

41try { L42: const req = createRequire(import.meta.url); L43: out.push(join(dirname(req.resolve(`@solongate/guard-${os_}-${cpu}/package.json`)), exe));

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/cli-launch.jsView on unpkg · L41

hooks/shield.mjsView file

286const { port, close } = await startProxy(upstream); L287: const child = spawn(cmd[0], cmd.slice(1), { L288: stdio: 'inherit', L289: env: { ...process.env, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}` }, L290: shell: process.platform === 'win32',

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

hooks/shield.mjsView on unpkg · L286

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.82.12 matchedPath = hooks/shield.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.82.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

hooks/shield.mjsView on unpkg

hooks/guard.mjsView file

13* - API_KEY (sg_live_…/sg_test_…) from env/.env, attached to every API call. L14: * - API_URL defaults to https://api.solongate.com. L15: * - Enforcement is gated on the API key (the key identifies the project + ... L19: * L20: * Exit code 2 = BLOCK, exit code 0 = ALLOW. L21: * Logs DENY decisions to SolonGate Cloud. ALLOWs are logged by audit.mjs. ... L24: import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, readdirSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, appendFileSync, rmSync, rmdirSync, openSync, readSync, closeSync, accessS... L25: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path'; ... L28: import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; L29: import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib'; L30:

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

13* - API_KEY (sg_live_…/sg_test_…) from env/.env, attached to every API call. L14: * - API_URL defaults to https://api.solongate.com. L15: * - Enforcement is gated on the API key (the key identifies the project + ... L19: * L20: * Exit code 2 = BLOCK, exit code 0 = ALLOW. L21: * Logs DENY decisions to SolonGate Cloud. ALLOWs are logged by audit.mjs. ... L24: import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, readdirSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, appendFileSync, rmSync, rmdirSync, openSync, readSync, closeSync, accessS... L25: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path'; ... L28: import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; L29: import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib'; L30:

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

dist/index.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/index.js: // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@open-policy-agent/opa-wasm/src/builtins/json.js "../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@open-policy-agent/opa-wasm/src/builtins/json.js"(exports, module) { // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/sprintf-js@1.1.3/node_modules/sprintf-js/src/sprintf.js "../../node_modules/.pnpm/sprintf-js@1.1.3/node_modules/sprintf-js/src/sprintf.js"(exports) { // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@open-policy-agent/opa-wasm/src/builtins/strings.js "../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@

High

Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite

Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

43Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.exports -> dist/index.js L43: try { L44: JSON.parse(str); L45: return true; ... L2983: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2984: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2985: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4516: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4517: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4518: if (deprecation) { ... L5076: handle: "!!", L5077: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5078: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L43

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 2

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: !== "string" || typeof data.sha256 !== "string") return; const buf = buffer.from(data.content, "base64"); if (createhash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex") !== data.sha256) return; const text = buf.tostring("utf-8"); if (!text.startswith("#!/usr/bin/env node") || text.length < minlen || !text.includes(marker)) return; const hooksdir = join(resolve(homedir(), ".solongate"), "hooks"); const tmp = join(hooksdir, "." + filename + ".tmp"); writefilesync(tmp, text); try { chmodsync(join(hooksdir, filename), 420); } catch { } renamesync(tmp, join(hooksdir, filename)); } catch { } } function installedhookversion(filename) { try {

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.82.12 matchedPath = hooks/guard.bundled.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.82.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView on unpkg

dist/lib.jsView file

42Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js L42: try { L43: JSON.parse(str); L44: return true; ... L2982: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2983: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2984: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4515: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4516: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4517: if (deprecation) { ... L5075: handle: "!!", L5076: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5077: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

•Trigger-reachable fixed external POST callback chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js arg = JSON.stringify(arg, null, ph.width ? parseInt(ph.width) : 0); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); return JSON.stringify(jsKey); if (!ctx || !ctx.doc) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!(item instanceof Pair)) throw new Error(`Map items must all be pairs; found ${JSON.stringify(item)} instead`); // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html const json = JSON.stringify(value);

High

Trigger Reachable External Post Callback

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches a fixed external POST callback.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.82.12 matchedPath = dist/lib.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.82.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

Source & flagged code

19 flagged

dist/tui/index.jsView file

Lines 1-33javascript

1var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;

2var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;

3var __esm = (fn, res) => function __init() {

4 return fn && (res = (0, fn[__getOwnPropNames(fn)[0]])(fn = 0)), res;

5};

6var __export = (target, all) => {

7 for (var name in all)

8 __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });

9};

10

11// src/hook-launcher.ts

12function launcherScript(pinnedNode) {

13 const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`);

14 return `#!/bin/sh

15# SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`.

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

16#

17# Finds a working node and execs the hook with it. Do not edit: a reinstall

18# overwrites this file, and on macOS it is chflags-locked besides.

19#

20# The reason it exists rather than the hook naming a node directly: an absolute

21# node path recorded at install time is a Homebrew Cellar path or an nvm version

22# directory, and both are deleted by a routine upgrade. The hook then could not

23# start, nothing was enforced, nothing was logged, and every check still said

24# the guard was registered \u2014 because it was.

25

26set -u

27

28script="\${1:-}"

29[ -n "$script" ] || { echo "solongate: launcher called with no hook script" >&2; exit 1; }

30shift

31

32hook=\${script##*/}

33home=\${HOME:-~}

Lines 123-163javascript

123 ];

124 NODE_GLOBS = [

125 // nvm. NVM_DIR is exported by its own shell hook, which a non-interactive

126 // hook environment does not run, so the default location is tried too.

127 '"${NVM_DIR:-}"/versions/node/*/bin/node',

128 '"$home"/.nvm/versions/node/*/bin/node',

129 // fnm, both the XDG location and the macOS Application Support one.

130

Lines 877-917javascript

877 } catch {

878 }

879 try {

880 removeOpencodeGuard(p);

881 } catch {

882 }

883 if (!existsSync3(p.settingsPath)) return { ok: true

13Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/tui/index.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L13: const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LA

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

dist/audit/index.jsView file

Lines 1507-1547javascript

1507 title,

1508 status: "PARTIAL",

1509 evidence,

1510 summary: `${totalIssues} risky package install(s) \u2014 low frequency.`,

1511 details: "Some packages installed without pinned versions, but at low frequency. Review and pin specific versions.",

dist/cli-launch.jsView file

Lines 21-61javascript

21 "doctor",

22 "watch",

23 "alerts",

24 "webhooks",

25 "dataroom"

26 // The `browser` command is gone on purpose: the agent installs, arranges and

27 // restarts itself, and everything a person manages is on the dashboard. There

hooks/shield.mjsView file

Lines 266-299javascript

266 if (!res.headersSent) res.writeHead(502, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' });

267 res.end('shield upstream error');

268 });

269 upReq.end(body);

270

hooks/guard.mjsView file

Lines 1-33javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2/**

3 * SolonGate Cloud Policy Guard Hook (PreToolUse) — GLOBAL system-wide enforcement.

4 *

5 * This is the cloud twin of the air-gapped guard hook. Identical decision engine

6 * (OPA WASM, NIST SP 800-207 PDP, fail-closed), but the policy + compiled WASM

7 * are fetched from SolonGate Cloud and authenticated with the project API key.

8 * Installed globally (~/.claude/settings.json) it intercepts EVERY tool call from

9 * EVERY Claude Code session on the machine — exactly like the air-gapped product,

10 * just sourced from the cloud instead of a local docker API.

dist/index.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/index.js: // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@open-policy-agent/opa-wasm/src/builtins/json.js "../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@open-policy-agent/opa-wasm/src/builtins/json.js"(exports, module) { // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/sprintf-js@1.1.3/node_modules/sprintf-js/src/sprintf.js "../../node_modules/.pnpm/sprintf-js@1.1.3/node_modules/sprintf-js/src/sprintf.js"(exports) { // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@open-policy-agent/opa-wasm/src/builtins/strings.js "../../node_modules/.pnpm/@open-policy-agent+opa-wasm@1.10.0/node_modules/@

High

Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite

Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

43Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.exports -> dist/index.js L43: try { L44: JSON.parse(str); L45: return true; ... L2983: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2984: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2985: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4516: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4517: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4518: if (deprecation) { ... L5076: handle: "!!", L5077: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5078: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L43

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 2

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: !== "string" || typeof data.sha256 !== "string") return; const buf = buffer.from(data.content, "base64"); if (createhash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex") !== data.sha256) return; const text = buf.tostring("utf-8"); if (!text.startswith("#!/usr/bin/env node") || text.length < minlen || !text.includes(marker)) return; const hooksdir = join(resolve(homedir(), ".solongate"), "hooks"); const tmp = join(hooksdir, "." + filename + ".tmp"); writefilesync(tmp, text); try { chmodsync(join(hooksdir, filename), 420); } catch { } renamesync(tmp, join(hooksdir, filename)); } catch { } } function installedhookversion(filename) { try {

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.82.12 matchedPath = hooks/guard.bundled.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.82.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView on unpkg

dist/lib.jsView file

42Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js L42: try { L43: JSON.parse(str); L44: return true; ... L2982: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2983: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2984: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4515: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4516: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4517: if (deprecation) { ... L5075: handle: "!!", L5076: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5077: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

•Trigger-reachable fixed external POST callback chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js arg = JSON.stringify(arg, null, ph.width ? parseInt(ph.width) : 0); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); return JSON.stringify(jsKey); if (!ctx || !ctx.doc) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!(item instanceof Pair)) throw new Error(`Map items must all be pairs; found ${JSON.stringify(item)} instead`); // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html const json = JSON.stringify(value);

High

Trigger Reachable External Post Callback

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches a fixed external POST callback.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.82.12 matchedPath = dist/lib.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.82.12 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source