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@solongate/proxy@0.90.2: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / @solongate/proxy / 0.90.2

@solongate/proxy@0.90.2

AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.

AI Security Review

scanned 4h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The CLI installs persistent hooks into several AI-agent control surfaces. Those hooks transmit conversations and tool metadata, and the guard can replace their code from the network.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

A user runs the global CLI setup, then uses a configured AI agent.

Impact

Remote control of installed hook code and disclosure of prompts, replies, and tool arguments to the vendor service.

Mechanism

Global hook registration, telemetry uploads, and network-delivered hook replacement.

Attack narrative

The setup code installs commands into multiple AI-agent hook systems and stores an API credential. On later agent events, those commands send conversation content and tool arguments to the vendor API. The guard also downloads hook code, validates it only against a hash delivered in the same API response, and replaces installed hooks atomically. This gives the remote service ongoing code control over hooks that run during agent activity.

Rationale

The package has no npm lifecycle trigger, but its setup path establishes broad persistent AI-agent hooks that exfiltrate agent data and accept remotely supplied replacement code. The combination is a concrete agent-control and remote-code risk.

Evidence

dist/index.jshooks/guard.mjshooks/conversation.mjshooks/audit.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/guard.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/audit.mjs~/.solongate/hooks/conversation.mjs~/.solongate/cloud-guard.json

Source & flagged code

27 flagged · loading source

dist/tui/index.jsView file

143// src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L143

897try { L898: const prof = execFileSync2("powershell", ["-NoProfile", "-Command", "$PROFILE.CurrentUserAllHosts"], { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L899: return prof ? [prof] : [];

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L897

13const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LAUNCHER_NAME); L150: if (process.platform === "win32") { L151: const ok = existsSync2(process.execPath);

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = dist/tui/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg

13const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LAUNCHER_NAME); L150: if (process.platform === "win32") { L151: const ok = existsSync2(process.execPath);

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

dist/audit/index.jsView file

1527var DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [ L1528: { pattern: /eval\s*\(/, label: "eval() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" }, L1529: { pattern: /\bexec\s*\(/, label: "exec() \u2014 arbitrary code execution" },

High

Eval

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

dist/audit/index.jsView on unpkg · L1527

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = dist/audit/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/audit/index.jsView on unpkg

dist/cli-launch.jsView file

41try { L42: const req = createRequire(import.meta.url); L43: out.push(join(dirname(req.resolve(`@solongate/guard-${os_}-${cpu}/package.json`)), exe));

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/cli-launch.jsView on unpkg · L41

hooks/shield.mjsView file

286const { port, close } = await startProxy(upstream); L287: const child = spawn(cmd[0], cmd.slice(1), { L288: stdio: 'inherit', L289: env: { ...process.env, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}` }, L290: shell: process.platform === 'win32',

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

hooks/shield.mjsView on unpkg · L286

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = hooks/shield.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

hooks/shield.mjsView on unpkg

hooks/guard.mjsView file

13* - API_KEY (sg_live_…/sg_test_…) from env/.env, attached to every API call. L14: * - API_URL defaults to https://api.solongate.com. L15: * - Enforcement is gated on the API key (the key identifies the project + ... L19: * L20: * Exit code 2 = BLOCK, exit code 0 = ALLOW. L21: * Logs DENY decisions to SolonGate Cloud. ALLOWs are logged by audit.mjs. ... L24: import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, readdirSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, appendFileSync, rmSync, rmdirSync, openSync, readSync, closeSync, accessS... L25: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path'; ... L28: import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; L29: import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib'; L30:

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

13* - API_KEY (sg_live_…/sg_test_…) from env/.env, attached to every API call. L14: * - API_URL defaults to https://api.solongate.com. L15: * - Enforcement is gated on the API key (the key identifies the project + ... L19: * L20: * Exit code 2 = BLOCK, exit code 0 = ALLOW. L21: * Logs DENY decisions to SolonGate Cloud. ALLOWs are logged by audit.mjs. ... L24: import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, readdirSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, appendFileSync, rmSync, rmdirSync, openSync, readSync, closeSync, accessS... L25: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path'; ... L28: import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; L29: import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib'; L30:

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: !== "string" || typeof data.sha256 !== "string") return; const buf = buffer.from(data.content, "base64"); if (createhash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex") !== data.sha256) return; const text = buf.tostring("utf-8"); if (!text.startswith("#!/usr/bin/env node") || text.length < minlen || !text.includes(marker)) return; const hooksdir = join(resolve(homedir(), ".solongate"), "hooks"); const tmp = join(hooksdir, "." + filename + ".tmp"); writefilesync(tmp, text); try { chmodsync(join(hooksdir, filename), 420); } catch { } renamesync(tmp, join(hooksdir, filename)); } catch { } } function installedhookversion(filename) { try {

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = hooks/guard.bundled.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView on unpkg

dist/global-install.jsView file

7Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/global-install.js spawns hooks/guard.bundled.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: import { createInterface } from "readline"; L8: import { execFileSync as execFileSync2, spawn } from "child_process"; L9: ... L41: const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L42: return `#!/bin/sh L43: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L70: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L71: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L72: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L140: import { homedir } from "os"; L141: var sgDir = () => join(homedir(), ".solongate")

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/global-install.jsView on unpkg · L7

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = dist/global-install.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/global-install.jsView on unpkg

dist/lib.jsView file

42Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js L42: try { L43: JSON.parse(str); L44: return true; ... L2982: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2983: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2984: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4515: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4516: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4517: if (deprecation) { ... L5075: handle: "!!", L5076: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5077: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

•Trigger-reachable fixed external POST callback chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js arg = JSON.stringify(arg, null, ph.width ? parseInt(ph.width) : 0); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); return JSON.stringify(jsKey); if (!ctx || !ctx.doc) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!(item instanceof Pair)) throw new Error(`Map items must all be pairs; found ${JSON.stringify(item)} instead`); // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html const json = JSON.stringify(value);

High

Trigger Reachable External Post Callback

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches a fixed external POST callback.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = dist/lib.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

dist/index.jsView file

43Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.exports -> dist/index.js L43: try { L44: JSON.parse(str); L45: return true; ... L2983: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2984: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2985: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4516: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4517: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4518: if (deprecation) { ... L5076: handle: "!!", L5077: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5078: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L43

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = dist/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

dist/global-install.js#virtual:string-array:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 5

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/global-install.js#virtual:string-array:round1View on unpkg

dist/commands/index.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = dist/commands/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/commands/index.jsView on unpkg

dist/logs-server.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = dist/logs-server.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/logs-server.jsView on unpkg

hooks/conversation.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.89.93 matchedPath = hooks/conversation.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.89.93 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

hooks/conversation.mjsView on unpkg