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@solongate/proxy@0.90.65: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / @solongate/proxy / 0.90.65

@solongate/proxy@0.90.65

AI tool security proxy: protect any AI tool server with customizable policies, path/command constraints, rate limiting, and audit logging. No code changes required.

AI Security Review

scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

An explicit global setup installs persistent hooks into several AI clients. Those hooks capture conversation content, transmit it to the vendor API, and permit remote replacement of installed hook code.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user runs the package's global setup or repair flow, then uses a configured AI client.

Impact

Prompts and assistant replies can leave the machine; the remote service can replace code executed on future AI-agent events.

Mechanism

Cross-client hook persistence, conversation upload, and remote hook self-update.

Attack narrative

After an explicit global installation, the package writes command hooks into Claude, Codex, Antigravity, and OpenCode configuration. The conversation hook receives user prompts and assistant replies and posts them to the configured SolonGate API. The guard later fetches newer hook bundles and replaces installed hook files, extending the remote service's control over future agent events.

AI rationale

This package has no npm lifecycle hook, but its explicit global setup persistently modifies broad AI-agent control surfaces, uploads conversation content, and remotely updates the executed hooks. These concrete capabilities exceed a normal local proxy and create a high-risk data-exfiltration and remote-code-update path.

Evidence

dist/global-install.jshooks/conversation.mjshooks/guard.mjs~/.claude/settings.json~/.gemini/config/hooks.json~/.codex/hooks.json~/.config/opencode/plugins/solongate.js

Source & flagged code

20 flagged · loading source

dist/tui/index.jsView file

143// src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L143

897try { L898: const prof = execFileSync2("powershell", ["-NoProfile", "-Command", "$PROFILE.CurrentUserAllHosts"], { encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); L899: return prof ? [prof] : [];

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L897

13const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LAUNCHER_NAME); L150: if (process.platform === "win32") { L151: const ok = existsSync2(process.execPath);

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.90.64 matchedPath = dist/tui/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.90.64 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg

13const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L14: return `#!/bin/sh L15: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L42: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L43: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L44: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L143: // src/hook-health.ts L144: import { execFileSync } from "child_process"; L145: import { existsSync as existsSync2, readFileSync as readFileSync3, statSync as statSync2 } from "fs"; ... L149: const launcher = join3(hooksDir(), LAUNCHER_NAME); L150: if (process.platform === "win32") { L151: const ok = existsSync2(process.execPath);

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/tui/index.jsView on unpkg · L13

dist/cli-launch.jsView file

41try { L42: const req = createRequire(import.meta.url); L43: out.push(join(dirname(req.resolve(`@solongate/guard-${os_}-${cpu}/package.json`)), exe));

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/cli-launch.jsView on unpkg · L41

hooks/shield.mjsView file

286const { port, close } = await startProxy(upstream); L287: const child = spawn(cmd[0], cmd.slice(1), { L288: stdio: 'inherit', L289: env: { ...process.env, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}` }, L290: shell: process.platform === 'win32',

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

hooks/shield.mjsView on unpkg · L286

dist/lib.jsView file

42try { L43: JSON.parse(str); L44: return true; ... L2982: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2983: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2984: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4515: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4516: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4517: if (deprecation) { ... L5075: handle: "!!", L5076: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5077: }]

High

Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

42Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js L42: try { L43: JSON.parse(str); L44: return true; ... L2982: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2983: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2984: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4515: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4516: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4517: if (deprecation) { ... L5075: handle: "!!", L5076: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5077: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

dist/lib.jsView on unpkg · L42

•Trigger-reachable fixed external POST callback chain: manifest.main -> dist/lib.js arg = JSON.stringify(arg, null, ph.width ? parseInt(ph.width) : 0); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); return JSON.stringify(jsKey); if (!ctx || !ctx.doc) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!ctx) return JSON.stringify(this); if (!(item instanceof Pair)) throw new Error(`Map items must all be pairs; found ${JSON.stringify(item)} instead`); // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html const json = JSON.stringify(value);

hooks/guard.mjsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.91.25 matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.91.25 similarity = 0.588 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg

13* - API_KEY (sg_live_…/sg_test_…) from env/.env, attached to every API call. L14: * - API_URL defaults to https://api.solongate.com. L15: * - Enforcement is gated on the API key (the key identifies the project + ... L19: * L20: * Exit code 2 = BLOCK, exit code 0 = ALLOW. L21: * Logs DENY decisions to SolonGate Cloud. ALLOWs are logged by audit.mjs. ... L24: import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, readdirSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, chmodSync, renameSync, appendFileSync, rmSync, rmdirSync, openSync, readSync, closeSync, accessS... L25: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L26: import { resolve, join, dirname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path'; ... L28: import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; L29: import { gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib'; L30:

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

hooks/guard.mjsView on unpkg · L13

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: !== "string" || typeof data.sha256 !== "string") return; const buf = buffer.from(data.content, "base64"); if (createhash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex") !== data.sha256) return; const text = buf.tostring("utf-8"); if (!text.startswith("#!/usr/bin/env node") || text.length < minlen || !text.includes(marker)) return; const hooksdir = join(resolve(homedir(), ".solongate"), "hooks"); const tmp = join(hooksdir, "." + filename + ".tmp"); writefilesync(tmp, text); try { chmodsync(join(hooksdir, filename), 420); } catch { } renamesync(tmp, join(hooksdir, filename)); } catch { } } function installedhookversion(filename) { try {

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

hooks/guard.bundled.mjsView on unpkg

dist/global-install.jsView file

7Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/global-install.js spawns hooks/guard.bundled.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: import { createInterface } from "readline"; L8: import { execFileSync as execFileSync2, spawn } from "child_process"; L9: ... L41: const pinned = pinnedNode.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`); L42: return `#!/bin/sh L43: # SolonGate hook launcher \u2014 generated by \`solongate init --global\` / \`repair\`. ... L70: # SHELL, before the command runs, so a \`2>/dev/null\` on the printf alone does L71: # not suppress it \u2014 it lands on the hook's stderr, and Claude Code shows a L72: # hook's stderr to the person using it. Redirecting the group catches both. ... L140: import { homedir } from "os"; L141: var sgDir = () => join(homedir(), ".solongate")

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/global-install.jsView on unpkg · L7

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.90.64 matchedPath = dist/global-install.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.90.64 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/global-install.jsView on unpkg

dist/index.jsView file

43Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.exports -> dist/index.js L43: try { L44: JSON.parse(str); L45: return true; ... L2983: // Keys in mapping nodes earlier in the sequence override keys specified in L2984: // later mapping nodes. -- http://yaml.org/type/merge.html L2985: addToJSMap(ctx, map) { ... L4516: function shouldWarn(deprecation) { L4517: const env = typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env || {}; L4518: if (deprecation) { ... L5076: handle: "!!", L5077: prefix: "tag:private.yaml.org,2002:" L5078: }]

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L43

dist/global-install.js#virtual:string-array:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 5

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/global-install.js#virtual:string-array:round1View on unpkg

dist/audit/index.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.90.64 matchedPath = dist/audit/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.90.64 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/audit/index.jsView on unpkg

dist/logs-server.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.90.64 matchedPath = dist/logs-server.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.90.64 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/logs-server.jsView on unpkg

hooks/conversation.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @solongate/proxy@0.90.64 matchedPath = hooks/conversation.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbG9uZ2F0ZS9wcm94eQ:0.90.64 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

hooks/conversation.mjsView on unpkg